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Interested in getting published in the

Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War
Era?
If you or anyone you know has written an
undergraduate paper in the past five years about the
Civil War Era or its lasting memory and meets the
following categories and requirements then visit our
website at http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/gcjcwe/ and
enter your work for consideration for next year‘s
publication.
Requirements and Categories for Publication:


Should be written and submitted in a Word
Document with Times New Roman, 12 point
font



Include a submission page with the following
information: your name, school, graduation
year, and the date the paper was originally
published

1. Academic Essays: Original research with
extensive use of primary and secondary sources.
Possible topics include but are not limited to
military history, social history, race,
reconstruction, memory, reconciliation, politics,
the home front, and etcetera. 6,000 words or
under.
2. Book Reviews: Any non-fiction Civil War related
book published in the last two years. Authors
3

should have knowledge of the relevant literature
to review. 700 words or under.
3. Historical Non-fiction Essays: This category is for
non-fiction works regarding the Civil War that
are not necessarily of an academic nature.
Examples of this include essays in public history
of the war, study of the re-enactment culture,
current issues in the Civil War field, etcetera
Creativity is encouraged in this field as long as it
remains a non-fiction piece. 2,000 to 6,000
words.
Any student with an interest in the Civil War may
submit. This includes graduate students as long as
the work submitted is undergraduate work written
within the past five years. If your submission is
selected, your work will be published online and in a
print journal, which you will receive a copy of for
your own enjoyment.
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A Letter from the Editors
It has been an absolute honor to serve as the
editors of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil
War Era for the spring of 2014. Fielding and reading
the scholarship of our peers in the field of the
American Civil War never fails to be informative,
and the width and breadth of article subjects
submitted this year broadened our own interest and
awareness of the numerous facets of the historical
discipline as it has been applied to this seminal
conflict in the development of our nation. Of
seventeen total submissions, it was a trying task to
select only five for final publication. We would like
to extend our profuse gratitude for the tireless
dedication of our associate editors, Valerie Merlina
(‘14), Heather Clancy (‘15), Brianna Kirk (‘15),
Thomas Nank (‘16), Kevin Lavery (‘16), and Steven
Semmel (‘16), without whom this effort would have
been exponentially more difficult. The guidance of
our faculty advisor, Dr. Ian Isherwood, has also
proven invaluable, as has his practice of letting us
find our own way whenever possible.
The five pieces included herein are an
eclectic mix of academic essays, book reviews, and
interviews that showcase the diversity of Civil War
Era Studies. This issue of the journal opens with
―Freedmen with Firearms: White Terrorism and
Black Disarmament During Reconstruction,‖ written
by David Schenk of Marquette University, which
deals with the oft-overlooked efforts of newly-freed
African-Americans to violently resist the white
supremacist oppression of the Reconstruction South.
Next comes ―Île à Vache and Colonization: The
5

Tragic End of Lincoln's ‗Suicidal Folly,‘‖ written by
Graham Welch of Georgetown University, in which
the original plan for the foreign settlement of free
blacks during the Civil War is examined in detail.
The first of our book reviews, written by Brexton
O‘Donnel of the University of Mary Washington,
analyzes Bruce Levine‘s 2013 work The Fall of the
House of Dixie, while the second, written by
Heather Clancy of Gettysburg College, looks at
Caroline Janney‘s 2013 book Remembering the Civil
War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation. The
journal closes with an exclusive interview with D.
Scott Hartwig, the recently retired Supervisory
Historian of Gettysburg National Military Park,
wherein he reflects on his own career and what the
future holds.
The entire process of compiling this issue has
been filled with trials and tribulations, as is any
editing job, and has assisted the both of us in
realizing our editorial and academic potential. It is
thus with the utmost pleasure that we present
Volume 4 of the Gettysburg College Journal of the
Civil War Era, and eagerly look forward to the
publication of many more.
Sincerely,
Bryan G. Caswell, Gettysburg College Class of 2015
Peter S. D‘Arpa, Gettysburg College Class of 2014
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Freedmen with Firearms: White Terrorism and
Black Disarmament During Reconstruction
David H. Schenk
Common American History 101 narratives of
post-Civil War Reconstruction have generally included
docile and helpless former slaves, who quietly adjusted to
the oppressive governance and terror of white Southern
peoples for nearly a century. This established narrative,
however, obscures another possible reason why organized
Freedmen gave up their fight for suffrage and basic civil
rights. Congressional records describe the early years of
Reconstruction with armed Freedmen communities
successfully defending their rights against white Southern
authorities and terrorist organizations. At the same time
these records also reveal efforts by these same white
Southern entities to systematically disarm African
American citizens.
African Americans fought hard for their political
and civil rights as new United States citizens, during a time
when they were reasonably well-armed and could
organize a viable resistance. In what could be described as
the disarmament period, these firearms were confiscated
through various means of violence and coercion. As a
result, the political agency of Freedmen was greatly
diminished, and the consequences are clearly represented
by reduced Freedmen poll numbers during the later years
of Reconstruction. Freedmen were largely willing to fight
and die for their rights as new U. S. citizens as long as
defiance remained a course of rational action. Disarmed
and overpowered by the weaponry of their oppressors,
9

African Americans grudgingly resigned themselves to the
politics of basic survival.
I. Voices of Authority and Insight
Nearly a month after the end of the Civil War in
May of 1865, Frederick Douglass addressed the
American Anti-Slavery Society on the future of
emancipated slaves. His tone was pessimistic because he
understood the challenges that lay ahead, and he warned
those in attendance that their work was not yet completed.
Douglass expressed his greatest fear for former slaves
living under white Southern authorities, explaining that
―The black man has never had the right either to keep or
bear arms; and the legislatures of the states will still have
the power to forbid it.‖1What Douglass expressed here
just weeks after the cessation of hostilities is the
premonition of another conflict on the horizon. Freedom,
citizenship, and the ability to vote were not enough to
assuage Douglass‘ worst fears, because without the
political agency of black firearm ownership, and by
extension the threat of an organized uprising, the actions
and policies of white authorities would have little restraint.
The Federal government fell extremely short of
securing the rights of freedmen, and Douglass saw this
future reality far in advance. Perhaps he understood all
too well the attitudes and indifference of the Northern
public, and that, for political reasons, Washington could

1

Frederick Douglass, ―The Need for Continuing Anti-Slavery
Work Speech,‖ in the Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass,
ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: International, 1975), 168.
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not possibly fulfill the Reconstruction visions put forward
by Radical Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens.2 Of
course, Douglass‘ eloquent speaking ability and political
pragmatism would preclude him from saying directly that
white northerners essentially just did not care about the
fate of Freedmen.
The closest Douglass comes to this statement is
so eloquently spoken that the meaning could be
reasonably misconstrued. ―I think the American people
are disposed often to be generous rather than just,‖ he
declared, then proceeded to list benevolent organizations
that have assisted African Americans. The questionable
duration of this aid was tied to a post-war public sentiment
and Douglass asked for something much more
sustainable: ―What I ask for the Negro is not benevolence
. . . but simply justice.‖3The great cause of the hour was
peacetime philanthropy directed at millions of freed
slaves, but the benefactors of these organizations were
part of the same tiny minority of Abolitionist whites; the

2

Eric Foner, "Thaddeus Stevens, Confiscation, and
Reconstruction," in Major Problems in the Civil War and
Reconstruction, ed. Michael Perman. 2nd ed. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1998. Excerptfrom The Hofstadter Aegis: A
Memorial. Edited by Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick. N.p.:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.
Frederick Douglass, "Frederick Douglass States the
Freedmen's Demands, April 1865," in Major Problems in the
Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Michael Perman, 286-87.
2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. Excerpt from "From
Frederick Douglass, Address to the Massachusetts Antislavery
Society, April 1865," inNegro Social and Political Thought:
Representative Texts, 1850 – 1920, ed. by Howard Brotz (Basic
Books, 1966), 286-287.
3
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same handful of people who would actually consider
inviting Douglass into their homes as an honored guest.
Douglass asked for the same constitutional
protections given to all Americans, such as the right to
assemble, speak, vote and own firearms. He stressed this
key to the black citizen‘s autonomy in his April speech
when he declared that, ―If the Negro cannot stand on his
own legs, let him fall . . . all I ask is, give him a chance to
stand on his own legs.‖4 The truth was that either through
the Federal retreat from Reconstruction, or a growing
condition of indifference, without the guarantee of justice
former slaves would soon be completely defenseless in
the former Confederacy. Organized citizens with firearms
were the only protection against oppressive Southern
authorities, and Douglass knew this long before
Reconstruction ended and the last Freedmen‘s Bureau
closed shop in 1877. The eventual creation and
implementation of Jim Crow laws, through which
discriminatory exclusions and restrictions controlled
nearly every facet of African American life, embodied
Douglass‘ worst-case outcomes for unarmed black
communities.
The post-Reconstruction South became the social
nightmare Douglass had envisioned, and black journalist
and activist Ida B. Wells reiterated his belief in armed
black communities nearly thirty years later.
Contemporary scholars consider Wells to be the mother
of the Civil Rights movement because of her innovative
and relentless approaches to racial violence and injustice.
4

Ibid.
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She publicized the horrors of epidemic lynching, led
successful economic boycotts of white businesses, and
revealed through her writings the harsh realities of late 19th
century Southern racism. In Southern Horrors: Lynch
Law In All Its Phases, Wells describes the only defense
available for black citizens:
The only case where the proposed lynching did
not occur, was where the men armed themselves in
Jacksonville, Fla., and Paducah, Ky., and prevented it.
The only times an Afro-American who was assaulted got
away has been when he had a gun and used it in selfdefense.5
Wells had extensive knowledge of white
terrorism throughout the whole of the U.S., and she
concluded that an armed black population was the only
means of immediate justice.
Wells‘ primary mission was spreading the truth
through the press and educating both the national and
global public, but the extensive amount of violence and
death demanded a far more archaic solution. Changes
would come—that was the heart of her crusade for
justice—but the life of a single black citizen was precious
and irreplaceable. Wells assessed that ―a Winchester rifle
should have a place of honor in every black home. . . .
When the white man . . . knows he runs as great a risk of
biting the dust every time his Afro-American victim does,
he will have a greater respect for Afro-American
5

Ida B. Wells, "Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its
Phases," 1892, inSouthern Horrors and Other Writings: The
Anti-Lynching Campaign of Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900, ed.
Jacqueline Jones Royster (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997), 70.
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life.‖6This violent conclusion reveals the realities of Wells‘
lifetime, where black citizens were dehumanized by much
of white American society. This is evident in Wells‘
detailed accounts of lynching where the victims were
treated in the most horrific and torturous manner.
Postcards from photographs of public lynching were
widely produced, marketed and sold to the general
public.7The attitudes of white Americans are conveyed
through their general indifference to these images that
were widely available at the time through the activism of
Wells and others.
A question emerges from the thirty years between
Douglass‘ and Wells‘ statements; what happened to all
the firearms that were in the homes of Freedmen and
former Union soldiers? Congressional testimony reveals
substantial amount of firearm ownership among African
American communities during the early years of
Reconstruction and a population willing to brandish them
in protest and self-defense.
The importance of firearms that Douglass and
Wells stress is insightful because quiet, helpless, and
docile black communities—those commonly found in
mainstream Reconstruction narratives—would never
dream of pointing loaded weapons at their white
neighbors. The will among blacks to resist and fight back,
however, was strong before and during the Civil War, and

6

Ibid.
Without Sanctuary: Photographs and Postcards of Lynching in
America, http://withoutsanctuary.org/main.html, Dec. 4, 2013.
7
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the period of Reconstruction and beyond was no
different.
During the antebellum period, slave uprisings did
occur, such as the highly publicized 1831 Nat Turner
revolt and John Brown‘s raid on Harpers Ferry. Because
of informants, however, most revolts were typically
prevented while still in the planning stage, with deadly
consequences for the conspirators. Slaves regularly risked
life and limb to escape to freedom in the North, and
when the opportunity to enlist in the Union Army and
Navy arose, 179,000 black soldiers and 10,000 black
sailors joined the fight.8In fact the fear of slave uprisings
was so great that in antebellum Louisiana the penalty for a
white person caught speaking or writing anything
promoting a slave revolt could be imprisoned for decades
or even executed.9These laws were generally aimed at
white northern abolitionists who had intentionally brought
their religious and moral crusades directly into the slave
holding states.
If millions of slaves were as docile and helpless as
current scholarship contends, it would take far more than
a white Yankee orator to instigate a full-scale uprising.
The often-violent backlash against abolitionist speech in
the antebellum South may have simply been an
overreaction, but on the other hand slave patrols and
local militias, which stood as a defense against mass slave

James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and
Reconstruction, 3rd ed.(Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher
8

Education, 2001), 383.
Ibid., 52.
9
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insurrections, were very common throughout the South in
this pre-Civil War period.
Four million slaves were a powder keg of
discontentment both before and during the Civil War,
and it will be demonstrated that this African American
spirit of rebellion did not simply end during
Reconstruction. The body of evidence to this effect
resides in congressional records and other various written
documents. In Africa, traditions and histories are
generally oral and hereditary in their storage and
transmission, unlike the meticulous systems of Western
recordkeeping, with books, libraries, and archives.10These
traditional oral histories also exist in North American
black communities, and run a quiet and parallel path to
the mainstream collections of written scholarship.
One such example is revealed in the famous
autobiography of Ralph Ellison, entitled Invisible Man,
which reveals a hidden story pertinent to the disarmament
of Freedmen. Ellison opens his narrative as a child at the
deathbed of his grandfather, who in his younger years was
an emancipated slave in the Deep South. Ellison focuses
on the dying words of his grandfather, which confess an
unforgivable cowardice and betrayal against his own
African American peoples. Speaking his last words to
Ellison‘s father he asks him to do what he was never able
to do in a lifetime:Son, after I‘m gone I want you to keep
up the good fight. I never told you, but our life is a war
and I have been a traitor all my borndays, a spy in the
Aran S. MacKinnon, The Making of South Africa: Culture
and Politics (Pearson:Boston, 2004), 330-333.
10
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enemy‘s country ever since I gave up my gun back in the
Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion‘s mouth. I
want you to overcome ‗em with yeses, undermine ‗em
with grins, agree ‗em to deathand destruction, let ‗em
swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open.11
After disarmament the politics of basic survival
replaced the active fight for real freedom, and Ellison‘s
grandfather never forgave himself for this surrender.
These were not simply the incoherent ramblings of a
dying old man, because the family reaction clearly
demonstrated a buried truth among the African American
descendants of Reconstruction. Ellison was extremely
bothered by his grandfather‘s last words because they
established a strong motivational basis for his later
introspections on black manhood. According to Ellison,
the effect on his parents was equally potent, and he
explains that these last words had a greater effect on them
than the actual death of his grandfather. Ellison recalls, ―I
was warned emphatically to forget what he had said and
indeed, this is the first time it has been mentioned outside
the family circle.‖12Ellison reveals a well-kept family secret,
which may in fact be an isolated incident with merely one
Freedman giving up his firearm to white authorities, but it
may also present a rare glimpse into a larger hidden story
of Reconstruction.

11

Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 1994 Modern Library ed. (New
York: Random House, 1994), 15-16.

12

Ibid.
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The reaction by Ellison‘s parents suggests there is
a substantially negative aspect to this confession, one that
might be very harmful to either family pride, or traditional
community narratives concerning the Reconstruction
period. There is nothing particularly shameful about a
single Freedman giving up his firearm to overpowering
Southern authorities. There would be little alternative to
do so in the face of such certain and deadly
circumstances, and this event would leave little if anything
to ponder and regret years later on one‘s deathbed. A
more reasonable conclusion is that Ellison‘s grandfather
was one Freedman among many who realized too late
what was happening on a larger scale. The opportunity for
armed resistance quickly passed away one firearm at a
time, until the only remaining action was to be a traitorous
black man like Ellison‘s grandfather saw himself as:
forever smiling and acquiescing to the enemy just to
survive.
The confession from Ellison‘s grandfather is not
significant in itself, but it does lend credibility to the
congressional testimony that will follow. A family secret
revealed through the rare autobiography of a midtwentieth century African American author might prove
to be as equally scarce. Yet, if the mass disarmament of
Freedman has been buried in the collective closet of the
African American consciousness, then Ellison‘s
recollection becomes merely the tip of the iceberg. The
only evidence to this effect exists in congressional
testimony compiled directly during the middle of the
twelve-year Reconstruction period (1865-1877).
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II. Terror and Disarmament: The Official Record
The 42nd U.S. Congress conducted extensive
hearings in 1871-1872 because of the growing threat of
terror organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan.13 The 13
volume published report is called Affairs In the Late
Insurrectionary States, and it records the detailed
testimony of victims, perpetrators, and witnesses. The
findings reveal the attitudes and actions of African
Americans living under the constant threat of violence
and intimidation. Black citizens were not alone because
white Republicans, Yankee businessmen, and
schoolteachers at black schools were also terrorized.
Testimony from the state of Mississippi reveals these
tangled lines of intimidation as Southern Democratic
powers worked to regain full control of their home state.

African American voices are largely absent from
the hearings, and this is simply the product of their low
standing in the nineteenth century U.S., but the testimony
of white associates and neighbors reveal an angry and
active black community. Joseph F. Galloway, a white
schoolteacher at St. Mary‘s Academy near Caledonia,
Mississippi, had regular encounters with the Ku Klux
Klan and testified about reactions from the black
community. The Klan believed that Galloway influenced
the political thoughts of his black pupils,and they wanted
him to stop teaching and leave the area. He refused to do
so and gained a position of leadership among the black
community.
McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 609.
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Terrorism had been increasing lately and a group
of local black leaders approached him and asked him ―if
there is not some way to get rid of these Ku Klux,‖ and he
replied that they would have to rely on government forces
to do that.14The men were not satisfied with his answer
and one angrily replied that ―they had waited on the
Government of the United States a good while now, and
were getting killed and whipped and abused all around. . .
. They would have to take it into their own
hands.‖15These Freedmen were not cowering like
frightened children from the regular Klan raids, but rather
they were very anxious to fight back somehow. They
approached the educated schoolteacher for guidance or a
plan of action, because they had the will to resist and the
weapons to do so. What they needed, however, was good
strategy from someone who could reasonably formulate
such things. Galloway refused to condone violence and
continued to discourage armed resistance, but eventually
he did admit that a firearm served as a strong deterrent
against Klan attacks.
The inquiry of terror continued along the lines of
resistance and the chairman of the committee asked a
leading follow up question to Mr. Galloway: ―These
ghostly fellows are afraid of arms, are they?‖ Galloway
replied, ―Yes, sir; very much so,‖ and he described an
incident where Klan members learned that their intended
victim was carrying a pistol. ―They went up to Caledonia
The Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States:
Mississippi, Vol. II, S. Rep. No. 42 -No. 41, pt. 12, 2d Sess.
14
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(1871), 670.
Ibid., 671.
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and left. They found that he had his arms that night and
went back and told them that it would not do any good to
whip him, so they let him off.‖16This line of questioning
was intended to either learn the mettle of Klansmen, or to
showcase their cowardice to a larger audience. The clear
point in either case was that the Klan was afraid of armed
Freedmen, and this may explain the focused acts of
disarmament that are revealed in later testimony.
The targeting of isolated and unarmed individuals
becomes apparent throughout later testimony, but this
does not mean that these white terrorists remained static
in their approach. Defenseless individuals would remain
the primary victims, but the systematic disarmament of
not so helpless Freedmen would become the first order of
business on nightly raids. Testimony from Captain
George W. Yates of the U.S. 7th Calvary described two
disturbing instances of firearm confiscation followed by
cold-blooded murder. The first altercation dealt with a
black woman seeking justice through Union Army
channels, and Yates relayed the incident in detail. ―An
armed band had visited her house. . . .She said they came
for arms, and [her husband] did not have anything but an
old gun. . . . They made him bring it out, and while in the
act of bringing it out he was shot.‖17
The second incident he described, which took
place just a few miles away, was even more brutal: ―She
said the party came there, several people that they called
for arms, and finally killed her husband and told her to go
16

Ibid.,673.
Ibid.,793.
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to bed.‖18 The Klansmen then proceeded burn the house
to the ground, which incinerated her husband‘s body and
killed their two children. Violence was escalating along
with the disarmament of Freedmen, and the reasons for
this are unclear. It could have been due to increasing
hostilities, or merely meant to affect the black turnout in
an upcoming election, but the record does not provide
any explanation.
Senseless acts of violence committed against
Freedmen must have been the accepted reality for the
congressmen conducting the inquiry, because they did not
press for reasons or motivations. The hunt to capture and
prosecute white terrorists takes center stage, and the
otherwise highly detailed record suffers from an
overemphasis on this objective at the expense of other
aspects of Reconstruction such as the sociopolitical
climate of the South. The Ku Klux Klan takes on
superhuman characteristics because of the often tabloid
quality of the hearings.
Secret Klan handshakes, disguises, and oaths are
treated with fascination and all the depth of inquiry found
in a developing conspiracy theory. The hearings dwell on
the disputed level of nudity a white woman was in when
law enforcement officers entered her bedchamber, and
this line of inquiry comes across like an example of
Victorian era pornography. A century and a half removed
from these hearings, the attitudes and values of this time
period come across as extremely strange in contrast with
contemporary sensibilities.
18
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Black communities were living in terror, and in
many instances actively resisting oppression, but the
Congressional Record more than often treats them like
inanimate objects. Armed freedmen were fighting back,
and efforts were underway to disarm them, yet all of this
remains at the extreme periphery of these congressional
documents. This struggle, however, emerges from the
testimony line by line when searching for Freedmen,
firearms, and conflict.
Testimony demonstrates that citizens were
generally well-armed in the Mississippi city of Meridian
and that a general state of hostilities existed between black
and white citizens. Klansmen had been coming over the
border from Alabama terrorizing and attacking freedmen,
while local white authorities did little to stop them. Riots
had occurred with a portion of the town set to fire, and
subsequent trials and arrests further intensified the
violence. A white citizen of Meridian, M.H. Whitaker,
provided extensive testimony concerning the condition of
unrest and the anger of black citizens. ―Large squads of
colored people were seen about in portions of the town in
an organized form, with arms,‖ he described, and when
the freedmen were questioned about the reason for state
of armed readiness, they explained that ―they were going
to fight the white people: if they wanted a fight.‖19 The
testimony does not focus on the motivations of the armed
freedmen, but it clearly demonstrates the general
numbers of weapons in their possession
19

The Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States:
Mississippi, Vol. I, S. Rep. No. 42nd - No. 41, pt. 11, 2d Sess.
(1871), 172.
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Whitaker surmised the count by comparison:
―White people always had arms, always kept one or two
guns about their premises, for squirrel hunting and bird
hunting. The colored people all have guns, I suppose, for
the same purpose.‖20 The common ownership of firearms
by freedmen is not isolated to Meridian, and later
evidence will demonstrate the expanse of an armed black
population across the former Confederate States. A
quantitative analysis after a century and a half is
impossible in all likelihood, but since this testimony is a
consistent sampling of a Reconstruction trend, it must
represent something much larger in scope.
Miles away from Meridian in Brooksville,
Mississippi, the story of armed Freedmen is quite similar,
but with an added element of coordinated firearm
confiscation. Former rebel soldier John R. Taliaferro
testified in depth concerning his relations with freedmen
and the Ku Klux Klan. He was not a member of the Klan,
but rather was a plantation owner who employed former
slaves. Taliaferro was questioned by congressman John
Coburn as to whether freedmen were the majority
population in the county and if they were all armed, and
Taliaferro replied to both in the affirmative and added,
―All the negroes who work for me, pretty much—have
shot-guns or something of that Kind.‖21
The follow up question concerned the
disarmament of these freedmen by the Ku Klux Klan,
20

Ibid.,200.
Ibid., 244.
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and Taliaferro replied, ―Yes sir; they have taken away
pistols and things of that kind from them. . . . Thirty or
forty pistols.‖22 He denied there was any form of
organized system of firearm confiscation, and that mass
disarmaments only took place after riots.
In later testimony, however, he makes mention of
a General Forrest coming down from West Point
Mississippi to calm down the population of Brooksville.
Another General followed this visit from West Point who
conducted a large-scale disarmament of freedmen.
Taliaferro recalled the event and qualifies the soldiers as
former Confederates. ―That was the occasion the when
the Negroes were disarmed,‖ he explained, "by captain
Franks, with his company from West Point. They came
down, of course, as citizen soldiers.‖23 The Confederate
army had been disbanded and outlawed as part of the
terms of surrender, but they were reorganized and had
participated in local affairs such as the confiscation of
firearms.
It is unclear whether this was in fact Nathan
Bedford Forrest, the first national leader and Grand
Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan,24 but this testimony referred
to events taking place around 1869 and this would be just
a year after the time when General Forest and other
former Confederate officers transformed the Ku Klux
Klan from a ―harmless fraternal order‖ into a ―hooded
terrorist organization‖ that James McPherson describes as
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―The military arm of the Democratic party.‖25The
presiding congressmen did not follow up this
disarmament testimony with any questions at all, and the
line of inquiry instantly shifted to the Mississippi public
school system, or lack thereof. If this was in fact General
Forest and his followers in action, and this may never be
known, then the newly organized and nationalized Klan
had disarmed Freedmen during broad daylight in
Brooksville, Mississippi. If this is the case, then white
terrorists dressed down as common citizen soldiers did
their most important work toward subjugating Freedmen,
and the U. S. Congress did not even take notice. The
testimony from Mississippi demonstrated some evidence
of systematic firearm confiscation, but across the border
in Alabama blatant and violent acts of disarming
Freedmen reached near epidemic proportions.

The act of disarmament appears at first to be
political in nature, and intended primarily to affect the
outcome of elections in favor of Democrats. Freedmen
voted in overwhelming numbers for Republican
candidates and the party of Lincoln was deeply despised
by white citizens throughout the former Confederate
States. This sentiment is clear and understandable for
those recently defeated in the Civil War and struggling to
restore a cohesive working order to their society. The
fundamental Southern hatred of Yankees, Republicans,
and Freedmen communities are not at issue here, but
rather the lasting effects of disarmament in the way of
long-term black political agency lost, and white racial
25
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oppression completely unfettered.
Testimony from Alabama presents a closer look
at the Ku Klux Klan in action and a well-armed
community of oppressed African Americans. Freedmen
had the will to fight and the armaments to do just that, but
what they lacked in hindsight was an educated leadership
that could form a qualitative plan of militant action.
Previous testimony describes a white schoolteacher
Galloway approached by freedmen in search of a strategy
for resistance to the Ku Klux Klan. White authorities and
their clandestine terrorist groups already had a plan in
motion to subjugate African Americans, the testimony
from Alabama offers a glimpse into these disarmament
operations.
The pages of testimony in Volume II Alabama
are so full of firearm confiscation incidents that they are
much too numerous to be listed here. The pattern begins
in the nighttime when masked and armed white men
arrive at homes or plantations where freedmen reside.
They demand under threats that any guns on the
premises be brought out and surrendered to them. When
this is accomplished through force, or merely the threat of
violence, then the African American residents are
generally abused, beaten, or murdered.

There are exceptions that hint of a more
organized and focused operation aimed merely at
disarming freedmen with minimal incidents of violence
being committed. George Cornelous worked at a
plantation in Madison County and gave a sworn affidavit
that described a streamlined raid one night. Twelve
27

Klansmen confiscated firearms from freedmen on his
plantation and another one nearby, and he described
their intended objective:―They also examined all the
houses for money, and asked if we knew who had guns,
pistols, and money.‖26The incident comes across as a
robbery because the objective seemed to be the search for
valuables and cash. Firearms can hold a significant value
depending on the condition and model, and these
Klansmen were probably of the mercenary variety. The
outcome of disarmament, however, was the same because
as Cornelous described in the aftermath of this raid,
―There is not a colored man in the Big Cove that had a
gun or pistol, they all having been taken by the Ku
Klux.‖27

Not all nightly raids by the Klan went so orderly,
and these instances demonstrate why the disarmament of
freedmen was so important for white Southern interests to
prevail. After learning of a Klan attack at a neighboring
plantation a group of armed freedmen, in anticipation of
being next, set up an ambush for the sixteen approaching
Klansmen. Second Lieutenant John C. Bateman of the
Union Army described the negative outcome for the
white terrorists: ―The Negroes returned the fire,
wounding, it is supposed, three of the party. . . . The
disguised men broke and ran, and were pursued by the
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negroes about a quarter of a mile.‖28 In the confusion of
retreat one Klansmen was killed by friendly fire, and the
others were most likely galvanized to enact the future
disarmament of freedmen by any means necessary.

Nightly raids and terror campaigns were very
common throughout Alabama, but not all forms of
firearm confiscation were this piecemeal in method. A
Freedmen‘s Bureau worker, John H. Wagner, who had
been living in Alabama since the end of the war,
presented evidence of a large-scale disarmament
operation. He described from secondhand accounts what
happened to all the confiscated arms from in and around
Huntsville: ―It seems that along in 1868, they would go to
a house and ask a Negro where his gun was; they knew he
had one. . . . They would say, ‗you have got one, we will
give you until such a day to take it to Markham‘s mill and
deposit it there.‘‖29This systematic method of firearm
confiscation was far different than the nightly raids, and
according to Wagner was also more effective: ―One old
man went to the mill, and he said he saw a thousand
stored there. Very often they would take the guns from
the Negroes and break them.‖30 This testimony identifies
a form of disarmament that does not reflect the robbery
and terror motivations of previous accounts. There was a
basic line of reasoning behind this organized operation
and Wagner addressed this question directly: ―I suppose
that the object was to keep the Negroes down. They
28
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thought they had no right to have guns. That is what they
say to them.‖31This testimony is from just one county and
does not prove a nationalized conspiracy, but within the
halls of Congress this issue was becoming central to the
politics of Reconstruction.
III. Armed Freedmen Under the U.S. Constitution
Klansmen and Southern authorities did their best
to maintain secrecy in the confiscation of firearms and
subjugation of African American citizens. Radical
Republicans in Washington, however, already had a clear
grasp on this disarmament practice and worked hard to
introduce new protective legislation. These progressive
politicians were generally from the pre-emancipation
ranks of abolitionists. They perceived African Americans
as fully human and fully equal citizens, and their
Reconstruction plans included the redistribution of land
and wealth to these former slaves.32The leading Radical
Republican Thaddeus Stevens, a Congressman from
Pennsylvania, was so extreme in his egalitarian politics
that ―when he died in 1868, he was buried in a black
cemetery because the main cemetery in Lancaster PA
refused to accept blacks.‖33 Stevens did not live to see the
dismal end of Reconstruction, but his beliefs and tenacity
set the tone for Radical Republicans who battled hard for
the rights of African Americans.
Among these Radical advocates for former slaves
was Congressman Benjamin F. Butler from
31
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Massachusetts, a former Union general and a strong
supporter of freedmen‘s rights. He introduced a bill that
would guarantee the Second Amendment34 right for
African Americans to keep and bear arms. Butler‘s work
would form the basis for what became the famous anti-Ku
Klux Klan Act, which has since been referred to in
contemporary legal circles as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Legal scholar Stephen P. Halbrook concludes from his
examination of the Butler bill it is clear that ―the Second
Amendment guarantee was the only provision in the Bill
of Rights mentioned by name‖35in the 1871 act. This
landmark legislation was passed to protect the civil rights
of freedmen with a strong focus on the right for them to
keep and bear arms. Halbrook is an avid gun rights
advocate, and this may taint the scholarship, but given the
limited work on this subject material it has been included
with a disclaimer. His conclusion appears reasonable
enough, however, because in 1871, the remnants of
Union forces and understaffed Freedmen‘s Bureaus were
not sufficient to protect African Americans from white
terrorist organizations. The Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed the full rights of citizenship, at least to all male
freedmen, and the anti-Ku Klux Klan Act should have
provided a greater degree of jurisdiction for the
enforcement of Federal laws including Second
Amendment protections.
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The events in Mississippi and Alabama were
being repeated all across the southern United States.
Justification for the Butler bill in the Congressional
Record recorded that 2nd Amendment violations were
being enacted by legal authorities, ―In Union County
[South Carolina], where all the negro population were
disarmed by the sheriff only a few months ago . . . five
hundred masked men rode at night and murdered and
otherwise maltreated the ten persons who were in jail in
that county.‖36Armed freedmen otherwise could defend
their family and neighbors awaiting trial for any number
of alleged crimes, but the confiscation of firearms in
South Carolina meant that many freedmen would not
survive to receive a constitutionally guaranteed trial by
jury.
It is not surprising that these violent acts took
place, because in both the North and the South, the postCivil War white public was generally indifferent to the
struggles of freed slaves. What is unusual is the strong
push by white radical Republicans to secure the rights and
liberties of freedmen, because their voting constituencies
would not have directly demanded these actions in any
great numbers. These actions may also have hurt the
chances of certain Republicans for reelection, but
indifference to the struggles of southern blacks was
generally the prevailing attitude of the day. The right to
defend oneself is fundamental among philosophical and
legal circles, and so the denial of Second Amendment
rights to freedmen would be reasonably troubling for
Republicans or anyone who perceived blacks as fellow
36
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human beings. These congressional battles for the benefit
of a greatly marginalized black population are an example
of bold progressive thinking put into the praxis of
legislation. Federal law was all that Washington politicians
could reasonably wield against restored Southern powers,
and radical Republicans did their best against the
prevailing political winds.
Not surprisingly, representatives from former
Confederate slaveholding states disagreed with the
protections found in the Butler bill. The argument put
forward was that the federal government had disarmed
the white southern populations and unleashed black
militias against them.37 This was generally not true, of
course, but it did serve to support an argument that could
not be readily disproved on the floor of the Congress.
There were black militias formed throughout the South,
armed by Federal and local governments, and there were
some incidents,38 but they were rarely if ever used by states
with Republican-controlled Governors. In fact, the
opposite was generally the case.39
When the war was over, tens of thousands of
black Union veterans returned to the South, but first they
purchased and kept their army muskets. But according to
Republican Representative George McKee from
Mississippi, they did not keep them very long. ―I have
seen those muskets taken from them and confiscated
under this Democratic law. The United States did not
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even protect the soldier in retaining the musket which it
had given him [during the war], and which he had borne
in its defense.‖40His point was that southern governments
should not be allowed to infringe on the rights of new
black citizens, and that legislation was desperately needed
to insure that this erosion of Civil Rights did not continue.
Butler debated fiercely for the passage of his bill,
because the confiscation of firearms was only the
beginning ofan organized oppression. The violence he
feared would otherwise continue and become grossly onesided with white terrorists and authorities subjugating
legally free citizens. In fact, in 1871, the line between law
enforcement and terrorism was often crossed. To make
this point, Butler read a troubling letter from Tennessee.
―The Ku Klux fired on them through the window one of
the bullets striking a colored woman. . . . The colored
men then fired on the Ku Klux, and killed their leader. . .
. He was identified, and proved to be ‗Pat Inman,‘ a
constable and deputy sheriff.‖41Allowing local state
ordinances and law enforcement the autonomy to dictate
firearm restrictions was certainly not acceptable according
to Butler.
Southern politicians and Northern Democrats
argued at length, and through concessions the Butler bill
continued to be stripped down to the point it became
ineffective at protecting the Second Amendment rights of
freedmen. There were provisions initially included
making it a federal crime to unlawfully confiscate firearms
Halbrook, Freedmen, 127.
Ibid.,127.
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from legal citizens. Representative Washington
Whitthorne from Tennessee argued against the provision
using an absurd example. ―If a police officer . . . should
find a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with
a loaded pistol flourishing it . . . [and if] he takes it away,
the officer may be sued because the right to bear arms is
secured by the Constitution.‖42The powers to interpret
Second Amendment protections were eventually
surrendered to state and local ordinances. The watereddown Butler bill, which became the Civil Rights Act of
1971, was not specific enough in its language, and this
allowed for a wide range of future Supreme Court rulings.
The armed conflict between freedmen and white
terrorists was part of a struggle by white citizens to restore
the old Southern order. This top-down, white-dominated
society would resemble the antebellum South in every
way possible if they had their way. Plantations filled with
subservient black workers would fill the landscape once
again, and the proper social orders would be restored to
their former glory. The greatest obstacles remaining as the
Reconstruction era wound to a close were Yankee
carpetbaggers, Scalawags, Republicans and, of course,
armed freedmen.43Federal prosecutions against Klansmen
succeeded in some states, but the vast stretch of southern
territory and webs of local authorities made it nearly
impossible to impose federal law in the former
Confederacy.
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Legal scholars had engaged the Fourteenth
Amendment44 with caution before by its passage, because
the central flaw of this constitutional correction was that
Federal authorities could not readily enforce it. The dean
of the New York University Law School, John Norton
Pomeroy engaged the issue in 1868, and his writing
presents an ominous preview of the Jim Crow South.
The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal
constitutional protections for all citizens, and Pomeroy
believed that it was the only viable solution for
discriminatory practices in the Reconstruction South. The
example he put forward focused on the Second
Amendment and equal treatment, because according to
how he interpreted this law, individual states could simply
create discriminatory regulations ―by which certain classes
of inhabitants—say Negroes—are required to surrender
their arms, and are forbidden to keep and bear them
under certain penalties.‖45The 14th Amendment did pass,
but it too retained the great impediment of being
extremely difficult to enforce. It did, however, open up
the means for more meaningful action when mass transit
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and media exposed the southern United States to greater
scrutiny in the mid-twentieth century.
The Fourteenth Amendment did have an early
day in court, one that tested the meaning of Federal
enforcement of the right of citizens to keep and bear
arms. The case originated with the infamous Colfax
Massacre in Louisiana in 1873, which was a protracted
battle between black militiamen and white terrorists.
Armed freedmen defended themselves at the Colfax
courthouse, against a much larger white force, after
disputed election results had erupted into violence.
Negotiations failed and the white mob set fire to the
courthouse, shooting anyone who tried to escape from the
fire.46 The violent incident created a string of legal battles
that went right up to the U.S. Supreme Court. Federal
jurisdiction in the matter was strongly disputed, and this
legal hurdle overshadowed the substance of both the
incident and constitutionality of the massacre.
The establishment of federal police powers was
too much of a stretch for the Supreme Court, and the
U.S. v. Cruikshank decision came down on the side of
state‘s rights.47 According to legal scholar Saul Cornell the
verdict set the legal tone for the Second Amendment for
the whole of the twentieth century. The states' rights
argument flows directly into the collective rights school,
where firearm laws are left to individual state
governments.48 During Reconstruction and the following
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decades, the decision of U.S. v. Cruikshank was
devastating for African Americans, because while their
rights as citizens were fully protected under Federal law,
there was no tangible legal apparatus available to enforce
these protections.
The Supreme Court by its decision had oddly
enough declared that the Federal enforcement of
Constitutional law was in fact unconstitutional. This legal
rift demonstrated the strange balance of power that
existed between the states and Federal government during
the nineteenth century. The same imbalances of legal
authority that fermented the outbreak of the Civil War
also created a legal minefield of absurdities that hampered
Federal efforts towards Reconstruction.
Conclusion
The consequences of the American Civil War
often resonate into present day society, and there are a
few who readily recognize these indelible signs of this
national tragedy. Scholars of the sectional conflict can
often find themselves unable to read a daily domestic
newspaper without finding something either distantly or
intrinsically connected to the Civil War Era. The origins
of this article, for example, are not the product of some
tattered and worn archive document, but rather a
contemporary Chicago Tribune article from 2010.49This
article highlighted the numerous Reconstruction Era
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examples used by Justice Clarence Thomas in a
contemporary Second Amendment case. Justice Thomas
is an African American justice who is often maligned for
his politically conservative tendencies on the court.
Regardless of his political leanings on gun rights, the legal
battles he described did turn out to be accurate.
Justice Thomas argued that the right of 19th
century freedmen to bear arms in self-defense still
remains central to the modern gun control debate. The
United States Supreme Court had ruled in 2010 that the
city of Chicago could not legally forbid its law-abiding
citizens from owning handguns, and in an attempt to
support this majority opinion Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas referenced events in the
Reconstruction period.50The Court had originally ruled in
1875, in the case of U.S. v. Cruikshank that Second
Amendment rights were to be determined by individual
state laws and that ―the 14th Amendment only required
the states to apply their laws about arms bearing in a nondiscriminatory fashion.‖51
Thomas recognized the gross deficiencies of this
ruling because discrimination itself was the rule of law in
the Reconstruction South. He warned against the court
leaving 2nd Amendment constitutional interpretations to
the jurisdiction of state governments because, as Thomas
recalled, ―Without federal enforcement of the inalienable
right to keep and bear arms, these militias and mobs were
50
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tragically successful in waging a campaign of terror against
the very people the Fourteenth Amendment had just
made citizens.‖52
Thomas also speculated about the devastating
effects of a Chicago-type civilian firearm ban and
concluded that ―African-Americans in the South would
likely have remained vulnerable to attack by many of their
worst abusers: the state militia and state peace officers.‖53
Reconstruction presented a dangerous ambiguity, because
Southern law enforcement could simply turn its back on
racial injustices, or as Justice Thomas suggested, become
the lead perpetrators of violence against African
Americans.
The confiscation of firearms from Freedmen
during Reconstruction remains a sparsely explored
avenue of scholarship, and this article creates more
questions than answers. Ascertaining the size, scope and
organizational structures, of what appears to be a regional
disarmament movement, would require a substantial
amount of further research. The political implications
alone could be staggering, because millions of African
Americans were eliminated from local and national
elections for nearly a century as a result of the
disarmament period. Current historic narratives maintain
that African Americans were simply frightened away from
politics, but the evidence presented in this article explains
the sudden, and largely tranquil race relations that
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emerged during the late and post-Reconstruction eras.

Ralph Ellison shared a family secret about his
grandfather giving up his firearm during Reconstruction,
and living as a traitor and spy behind the enemy lines of
an ongoing war. Perhaps this account was fictionalized, or
merely the distorted thoughts of a dying old man. What
if, however, this really was a universally well-kept secret in
the African American community, and was otherwise
taken silently to millions of graves? This possibility would
not be outside of the realm of reasonable scholarship,
because the genuine history of oppressed and
marginalized peoples is most commonly buried with
them.
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Île à Vache and Colonization: The Tragic End of
Lincoln's ―Suicidal Folly‖
Graham Welch
―I shall, if I get a sufficient number of you
engaged, have provisions made that you shall not be
wronged.‖54 These words from President Abraham
Lincoln in 1862 would prove to be prophetic for all the
wrong reasons when, in two years, 350 freed blacks and
emigrants returned to the United State in tattered Union
army uniforms, all victims of a disastrous attempt at
settlement abroad on the Haitian island of Île à Vache.55
A policy vision that existed from the embryonic days of
the United States, the settlement of former slaves abroad
had its opportunity in practice on the island under the
aegis of the Lincoln administration and its representatives,
all to collapse in a venture marred by disease, corruption,
incompetence, and death. This event proved to have a
significant effect on Lincoln, and ended a life-long
exploration of colonization for both him and the nation.
Through reconsideration following abject failure, Lincoln
embraced policies of black inclusion that would have
transformative impacts both on the Civil War and the
nation going forward. Through disaster, the Île à Vache
endeavor put an end to one of the more controversial
legacies of Abraham Lincoln, ultimately forcing him to
embrace a multiracial future.
Roy P. Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln
(Springfield, Il: The Abraham Lincoln Association, 1953):
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The decision to send freed men, women, and
children to Île à Vache was not the brainchild of Lincoln,
rather it was the tangible completion of decades of
colonization rhetoric and action throughout the United
States. Colonization, the state-sponsored emigration and
resettlement of freed slaves outside of the United States,
possessed a deep legacy in the early United States.56
Thomas Jefferson, in his 1785 Notes on the State of
Virginia, documented his concerns over the justice of
forced bondage as well as ―new provocations‖ of slavery
that could arise in the future, and later took an interest in
political proposals of colonization.57 The political
legitimization of colonization began in 1816, when
Virginia Delegate Charles Fenton Mercer and New Jersey
Reverend Robert Finley established the American
Colonization Society (ACS), emerging as the preeminent
colonization organization.58 Even Henry Clay, Lincoln‘s
―beau ideal of a statesman‖ and Whig forbearer took an
active interest in the ACS alongside other early national
luminaries John Marshall, Francis Scott Key, and James
Madison.59 By its own estimates, the ACS had aided in the
Eric Foner, ―Lincoln and Colonization,‖ in Our Lincoln: New
Perspectives on Lincoln and His World, ed. Eric Foner (New
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emigration of 11,909 African Americans from the date of
its founding through 1867, though only a negligible
amount occurred following the outbreak of war.60
Furthermore, local colonization groups emerged across
the United States from Providence to Augusta, frequently
pressing state governments for funding of prospective
journeys.61 Colonization was hardly a passing political
fancy, but rather was an ingrained belief in the minds of
many of the young nation‘s leaders. However, it also
remained to be seen whether such proposals could ever
succeed in reality on a larger scale and with governmental
assistance, a question that would be answered with the
failure of Île à Vache.
Support for colonization was widespread
throughout the antebellum United States, albeit for
divergent motivations. In the North, colonization
sentiment arose from a similar religious vein as
abolitionism, specifically a post-Great Awakening
missionary impulse to both remove bondage at home and
to project the Gospel abroad.62 There were also calls for
colonization strictly as a means to control a rising labor
force of freedmen, as evidenced by the Tammany Hall
Young Men‘s Democratic Club‘s resolution in March

noble in its object of removing a great evil from its own
country.‖ (Staudenraus 183)
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1862: ―we are opposed to emancipating negro slaves,
unless on some plan of colonization, that they may not
come into contact with the white man‘s labor.‖63 Southern
colonizationists, including those who saw no moral
objection to slavery, argued that exclusion of free blacks,
coupled with gradual emancipation, would be beneficial
for white planters in the future and reduce the threat of
black retribution.64 Both attitudes were shaped by a
pseudoscientific notion of race that emerged in the 1830s
and continued to the age of Lincoln, centered on the
supposed infeasibility of a multi-racial state.65 It was
evident that mixed motivations were at the heart of
colonization, and would further demonstrate the
difficulties of implementing effective policy.
As colonization movements gained credence in
national and state discourse, one powerful political
advocate emerged in Washington from Springfield,
Illinois, in the form of Abraham Lincoln. Leaders in
colonization circles recognized his personal devotion to
the movement, as in 1853 and 1855 Lincoln addressed
the annual meeting of the Illinois Conservation Society.66
Lincoln‘s support of colonization, as evidenced through a
63
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lifetime of speeches, came from a sincere and profound
desire to improve the condition of African Americans,
even in this misguided venture. This sentiment of
benevolence is evident in Lincoln‘s 1852 eulogy for
Henry Clay, in which the future President speaks of a
longing for justice ―in restoring a captive people to their
long-lost father-land, with bright prospects for the future;
and this too, so gradually, that neither races nor
individuals shall have suffered by the change.‖67 Later
speeches reflected this pattern for Lincoln, as he
expressed the same missionary impulse that guided early
colonization advocates in one 1857 speech in which he
invoked Christian duty to the policy, comparing African
Americans to enslaved Israelites.68 This rhetoric also
emphatically disproves a prevalent historical narrative
surrounding Lincoln and colonization espoused by James
Oakes, in which he described colonization rhetoric as
solely political grandstanding and pandering to ―make
emancipation more palatable to white racists.‖69 Lincoln‘s
words and actions throughout his public life establish his
sincere dedication to the cause of colonization, which
would ultimately conclude with the failed experiment at
Île à Vache.
Lincoln‘s decision to approve the Île à Vache
venture stemmed from a combination of logistical and
diplomatic convenience that had proven impossible in
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other possible locations. Upon his inauguration, Lincoln
explored possible venues for colonization, including
directing his Minister to Guatemala with gauging interest
in colonization projects throughout the Americas.70 By
1862, the administration had narrowed possible locations
for emigration into the Western Hemisphere. While the
West African nation of Liberia had been a location of
interest since its founding by the American Colonization
Society in 1822, attempts at state building quickly failed,
and left the nation in the midst of disease and a harsh
diplomatic climate.71 Lincoln himself lamented this reality,
stating, ―If they were all landed there in a day, they would
all perish in the next ten days,‖ but his acceptance of the
infeasibility of transatlantic colonization further
demonstrates his practical nature in the matter of black
emigration.72
After eliminating Liberia as a feasible option,
Lincoln explored the possibilities of emigration to Central
and South America, a policy that entailed new diplomatic
challenges. Much of this diplomatic responsibility fell on
the shoulders of Secretary of State William Seward, a
staunch advocate of assimilation, who publicly declared,
―I am always for bringing men and states into the Union,
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never for taking any out.‖73 Lincoln acknowledged these
difficulties before, stating, ―The political affairs in Central
America are not in quite as satisfactory condition as I
wish.‖74 The administration, per the advice of the Sen.
Samuel Pomeroy and Rev. James Mitchell, Lincoln‘s
Commissioner of Emigration and Colonization, found the
most favorable scenario in the province of Chiriqui, in
present day Panama.75 Lincoln had initially authorized the
mission under the auspices of ―coal and privileges,‖ but
that promise proved unfounded when Joseph Henry of
the Smithsonian Institute found Chiriqui coal to not only
be poor for steam engines, but dangerously flammable.76
In addition, background checks revealed that the private
speculator behind the Chiriqui venture had been
suspected of embezzlement, prompting a swift
reconsideration of this specific plan.77 By September
1862, the Central American plan was dead, leaving one
remaining option to fulfill Lincoln‘s dream of
colonization in Île à Vache.
As Lincoln explored emigration opportunities in
Central America and the Caribbean, he drew the ire of
abolitionist groups both black and white. National
abolition figures had been wary of Lincoln‘s proposals to
prevent the spread of slavery and gradual emancipation
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since his arrival on the national stage.78 On colonization,
however, these disagreements reached a fever pitch, such
as William Lloyd Garrison‘s public denouncement of
―puerile, absurd, illogical, impertinent, and untimely‖
schemes in his periodical The Liberator, placing
responsibility on the President who endorsed them.79
These disagreements accompanied colonization during
his presidency, but became most raucous upon his
meeting with the Deputation of Negroes in 1862.
The antipathy between Lincoln and abolitionists
on the issue of colonization reached its apogee on August
14, 1862, when a committee of five African American
leaders met with Lincoln at the White House. These men
might not have been the best audience to colonization
proposals, as three were members of a black abolitionist
group that had recently been responsible for the
banishment of emigration lobbyists from Washington.80
Lincoln outlined his colonization proposals, but his
rationale, particularly the statement ―you and we are
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different races. We have between us a broader difference
than exists between almost any other two races,‖ met a
harsh rebuke.81 The outcry to this meeting in the black
community was widespread, evidenced by Frederick
Douglass‘ characterization of Lincoln as a ―genuine
representative of American prejudice and Negro hatred.‖
in the September 1862 issue of Douglass‘ Monthly.82
Ultimately this experience demonstrated a key problem
for Lincoln regarding colonization, specifically that the
President, who had limited experience with African
Americans in his personal life, had drastically misgauged
black resistance, which was nearly universal.83
The negation of transatlantic and Central
American colonization schemes, while disheartening to
Mitchell and other advocates, also opened the
opportunity for the venture to Île à Vache. The proposal
did not emerge from within the administration, but rather
came per the solicitation of Bernard Kock, an American
speculator who had obtained an agreement with the
Haitian government for ten-year privileges for timber on
Île à Vache, a hilly island off of the coast of Haiti roughly
25 square miles in size.84 Kock found entry into the White
House through frequent correspondence with Mitchell,
81
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supplementing his own legitimacy by appending his
correspondence with the title ―Governor of A Vache.‖85
Mitchell was aware of Haiti as a possible locale for
colonization, as the abolitionist and Republican activist
James Redpath had funded a campaign to export
freedmen to the main island from 1860-62; this project,
however, quickly foundered, as Redpath encountered
both Haitian opposition and financial difficulties that
forced his retreat.86 Nonetheless, the prospects of a
federally-funded colonization venture proved enticing for
Mitchell, who agreed on the terms of a contract with
Kock on November 6, 1862: 5,000 free blacks would
depart to Île à Vache at the rate of $50 per person in
transfer costs, with Kock also responsible for the
construction of sufficient living quarters, medical facilities,
and the distribution of fair wages.87 The contract also
included $600,000 in funds authorized by Congress for
the purposes of colonization, no insignificant amount at a
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time when the overall federal budget was slightly greater
than $60 million and the nation was at the peak of the
Civil War, costly in both dollars and lives.88 On Île à
Vache, the Lincoln administration had found an ideal
location for a federally funded colony, and December 1,
1862, only a month before the signing of the
Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln had agreed to terms
with Kock, and the first government-run colonization was
afoot.89
The Île à Vache proposal also succeeded in
satisfying the one unwavering aspect of Lincoln‘s
colonization policy, specifically that it remain voluntary.
During one Cabinet debate over colonization proposals,
in reaction to a suggestion of compulsory deportation,
Lincoln emphasized, ―Their emigration must be
voluntary and without expense to themselves.‖90 This
unwavering belief in colonization as strictly a voluntary
measure further demonstrates Lincoln‘s earnest
conviction that blacks would be inclined to pursue
emigration. On paper, Île à Vache was the ideal
opportunity to do just that.
The first inauspicious signs of the Île à Vache
venture emerged nearly immediately after the
administration approved the contract with Kock. After
Lincoln approved Secretary Seward‘s request for a
temporary investigation into Kock on January 8, 1863,
88

Lockett 431. Magness and Page, 4.
Lockett, 437.
Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the
Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Volume 1 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 152.
89
90

55

one month after the signing of the initial contract, word
began to trickle into Washington concerning the
―Governor.‖91 Statements from New Orleans depicted a
man who had used deceptive business practices to unload
shipments of low-quality tobacco on unsuspecting
merchants, while the United States Commissioner in
Haiti spoke of Kock as an unpopular figure in Port-auPrince and just as forebodingly, had not yet heard of any
progress in constructing a settlement on the island.92
These allegations overwhelmed to both the Interior
Department and the President, and on April 16, 1863,
Lincoln formally rescinded Kock‘s contract.93 Shortly
beforehand, on March 20, Lincoln agreed to terms with
more reputable characters, Wall Street financiers Paul S.
Forbes and Charles K. Tuckerman, for a rate of $50 per
colonist at a maximum of 500 colonists.94 Unfortunately
for the expectant colonists, this transfer would not spell
the end for Bernard Kock in Haiti, as ultimately his
actions at the helm of the failed colonization project
would validate Attorney General Edward Bates‘ claim that
he was but ―an errant humbug.‖95
As for the black settlers themselves, sources and
documentary evidence of their lives both before and after
Île à Vache are regrettably limited. Records from Fort
91
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Monroe, however, reveal that they were ―principally
Virginia Negroes from the Tidewater area around
Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond,‖ and by status as
contrabands, represented an ideal group for the
experiment
of
emancipation
and
subsequent
96
colonization. The chosen colonists for the project
represented a unique subsection of newly freed blacks;
aside from a few family units, the settlers were individuals
divided relatively evenly by gender.97 Their enthusiastic
reaction to the prospect of colonization provided hope
for future projects, as accounts describe those chosen to
have exalted cries of ―Amen‖ and ―Hallelujah‖ in
anticipation of a future of landowning and true freedom.98
Desire to depart former Confederate territory was a
common sentiment for freed slaves under federal
jurisdiction, as conditions for these ―contrabands‖ were
rife with disease and malnutrition.99 These aspirations for
improvement would tragically not come to fruition on Île
à Vache, and ultimately their experience defined the
human element of the disaster.
From the moment the vessel Ocean Ranger
departed Fortress Monroe on April 14, 1863 carrying 453
black settlers, the mission to colonize Île à Vache was an
unmitigated failure.100 The journey itself demonstrated the
96
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inherent dangers of mass ocean transport, as a major bout
of smallpox killed at least twenty-five settlers at sea, while
the survivors were allegedly forced to pay for their own
water rations.101 The real horrors began, however, once
the settlers arrived on the island, as Kock instituted a
policy of ―no work: no rations‖ that rivaled any
antebellum plantation.102 The contractors had reneged on
their duty to construct any serviceable accommodations to
protect them from the ravages of exposure, and the
emigrants were left to construct crude huts for any shelter.
Meanwhile, disease raged across the island from an
outbreak of fever, killing a number of freed men and
women.103 In addition to their physical maladies, colonists
suffered psychologically from what physician and Île à
Vache witness Dr. James Brazier deemed ―homesickness
[and] depression of the spirit‖ in an interview with the
Freedmen‘s Inquiry Commission in December 1863.104
Concurrently, attempts at cultivation proved unfruitful
and starvation soon coupled with disease on the island,
forcing the survivors to subsist on the decaying remains of
corn and salt pork from the journey.105 The situation on
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Île à Vache was nothing short of nightmarish,
unbeknownst to its promoters at home.
Washington remained ignorant of these
developments, aside from a June 1, 1863 report from
George C. Ross, American Vice-Consul at Aux Cayes,
Haiti, confirming that operations were ―flourishing under
the able, wise and humane director of its projector,
Bernard Kock.‖106 Evidently Forbes and Tuckerman,
ignorant on the logistics of colonization, had appointed
Kock to coordinate their operation on the ground.107 By
July 1863, the emigrants had reached a breaking point of
mutiny, and the terrified ―Governor‖ fled the island for
his life, while the Haitian government dispatched a
military unit to maintain order.108 Within weeks, word of
these atrocities reached American soil through Southern
press outlets, and the nation and its leaders would learn
the harsh realities of colonization, but not before rescuing
the destitute colonists.109
The most significant outcome of the catastrophe
at Île à Vache was its profound impact on Lincoln,
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specifically his decision to not only rectify the situation as
quickly as possible, but also never engage in further
ventures of colonization. In response to these atrocities,
Lincoln acted curiously slowly to rectify the situation and
remove the emigrants from a situation for which he was
ultimately responsible. In mid October 1863, more than
three months after the first media accounts of the island‘s
conditions emerged, Lincoln ordered D.C. Donnohue, a
former legal associate of Secretary Usher, to sail to Île à
Vache and verify the reported conditions on the island
while offering immediate aid to the victims.110 In the
meantime, Lincoln was preparing the rescue of the
victims of this failed operation, ordering Secretary Stanton
on February 1, 1864 to commission a naval vessel,
complete with supplies and medical personnel, to depart
immediately to the island for rescue purposes.111 By
March 4 1865, the U.S. Navy‘s Marcia C. Day had
departed from Île à Vache with 350 surviving emigrants,
reaching its ultimate destination in Alexandria, Virginia,
per Lincoln‘s orders.112
According to future Assistant Commission of the
Freedmen‘s Bureau John Eaton, Lincoln expressed grave
distress over the failure on Île à Vache, and was left
shaken by the experience.113 The timing of the incident
was unfortunate for all sides, as reports of Kock‘s Haitian
fiefdom emerged just as the dust was settling at Gettysburg
110
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and the War continued in full throughout the summer.
Nonetheless, it remains significant that Lincoln, once fully
aware of the atrocities committed under his watch,
ultimately acted to set the situation right and return the
emigrants to their nation of birth.
In the aftermath of Île à Vache, its primary actors
were quick to pronounce blame for the disaster in nearly
all aspects of the operation. Forbes and Tuckerman were
quick to denounce the actions of the man they appointed
to run the colony, blaming the ―obnoxious‖ Kock for
dereliction of duty and breach of contract in one public
statement.114 In addition to the rampant acts of
exploitation on the island, federally-promised support
proved to be an illusion to both the emigrants and their
benefactors; of the $600,000 allocated for colonization
efforts, only $38,329.93 was ever spent on Île à Vache, a
majority of which went straight to the salaries of Rev.
James Mitchell, expenses such as the transportation costs
for the project, and compensation to Sen. Samuel
Pomeroy for his legislative assistance in the project.115
Forbes and Tuckerman were unable to recoup their
investment that ended up totaling over $90,000 despite
their protestations, which included the publishing of a
self-exonerating pamphlet that deflected the majority of
the blame onto the Interior Department and Kock.116
Usher‘s Interior Department, ―eager to forget a fiasco that
was held up to ridicule by the increasingly powerful
Radical branch of the Republican Party,‖ was reluctant to
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request funds at the risk of spectacle, and Forbes and
Tuckerman‘s appeal ultimately went unheeded.117
Curiously enough, Kock attempted to return to the island
where he had caused so much havoc on Christmas Day
1863, only to flee in terror on the first boat out when he
learned of threats to his life at the hands of those he had
exploited.118 Ultimately, the responsibility for this
humanitarian disaster lay at the feet of the Chief
Executive, and his reaction proved monumental in the
end of colonization as a chimera in American policy.
Following his reversal of the Île à Vache venture,
Lincoln not only remained silent on the failed Haitian
colony, but also never issued another public statement
concerning colonization, a decision that is astounding
after his many prior proclamations on the matter.119 His
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abandonment of colonization as a viable policy option
was evident in his acceptance of Minnesota Senator
Morton S. Wikinson‘s bill introduced on March 15,
1864, which formally withdrew any federal funds for
future colonization. Upon its passage on July 2, Lincoln
signed the bill, and the colonization in the United States
was effectively dead, with nary a word from the
President.120 Colonization was officially an afterthought in
Congressional policy as a direct result of Île à Vache, but
it was Lincoln‘s rejection that would prove to be the nail
in the moribund movement‘s coffin.
Despite his silence on the matter, Lincoln‘s
abandonment of colonization as a viable policy in the
wake of Île à Vache is evident through the commentary of
those still involved both in the administration and
dwindling colonization efforts. On July 1, 1864, nearly
four months since the last of the Île à Vache refugees had
returned to Washington, Lincoln‘s personal secretary
John Hay expressed relief when he wrote, ―I am glad the
President has sloughed off that idea of colonization. I
have always thought it a hideous & barbarous humbug &
the thievery of Pomeroy and Kock have about converted
him to the same belief.‖121 The inclusion of Pomeroy and
Benjamin Butler‘s Spurious Testimony,‖ Civil War History 25,
No. 1 (March 1979): 79-80.
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Kock in this statement further shows the specter of Haiti
within the administration. Conversely, Pomeroy became
increasingly frustrated with a lack of new emigration
efforts, and wrote to Lincoln in demand of action for the
estimated fourteen thousand freedmen who had reached
out to Pomeroy in hopes of manning the next colony.122
Emancipation was a watershed moment for ACS activists,
and abandonment by a perceived ally in the White House
proved fatal; the organization, which had already been
operating under heavy costs without matching incomes,
dwindled in popularity until it published its final
newsletter, The African Repository, in 1892.123 Through
making the deliberate effort to remain silent on
colonization, but also to ignore any possibilities of future
endeavors following Île à Vache, Lincoln showed the
transformative impact this failure had on his evolution
toward a dying policy.
The abject failure of the Île à Vache venture had
dramatic ramifications for the Lincoln administration in
its aftermath, as preexisting rivalries and disagreements
within the White House reached an apex. Opinions on
colonization were split nearly evenly across Lincoln‘s
cabinet, with Seward, Welles, and Stanton firmly against
any such proposals, while Interior Secretaries Caleb
Smith and John Usher, alongside Postmaster General
Montgomery Blair were vocal in favor of colonization as a
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policy measure.124 Many of these arguments centered
Emigration Commissioner Mitchell, who frequently drew
the ire of his superiors in the Interior Department with
his frequent association with speculators and other lessreputable colonization advocates.125 Île à Vache provided
an ideal opportunity for an incensed Usher to freeze
Mitchell‘s salary and have him expelled from his office.126
These disagreements also embroiled the President
himself, particularly regarding his Secretary of State,
William Seward. While Seward fulfilled his duties to
explore colonization options, he frequently voiced his
displeasure to the President.127 While recovering from an
assassination attempt within the same conspiracy that had
killed Lincoln, Seward told an interviewer, ―Only once…
did we disagree in sentiment… His ‗colonization‘ scheme,
which I opposed on the self-evident principle that all
natives of a country have an equal right in its soil.‖128 The
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Lincoln administration provided an ideal microcosm of
the debates over colonization, and ultimately the fiasco at
Île à Vache brought these debates to the forefront.
In the public arena, media coverage of the Île à
Vache disaster proved to be overwhelmingly negative
towards colonization as a policy option for the Lincoln
administration and allies. Colonization efforts in the
Caribbean in the months preceding Emancipation already
elicited outcry from Northern media members of both
political parties. The Democratic New York Evening
Express railed against logistical costs that deportation
would ―entail upon the White Labor of the North,‖ while
the Republican New York Times offered an equally blunt
editorial statement: ―‗No, Mr. Pomeroy. No, Mr.
President. The enfranchised blacks must find homes,
without circumnavigating the sea at the National
expense.‖129 The media reaction was swift following Île à
Vache, and following its report of the material failings of
the operation, the Chicago Tribune issued an editorial
with the prescient title ―The End of Colonization.‖ In it,
the staff swiftly declared, ―We have probably seen the last
of a long line of attempts to colonize the blacks from this
country‖ due to infeasibility in both logistics and black
desire, observing, ―their general reluctance to leave the
country is a good reason why they should not.‖130 African
American newspapers issued sentiments of relief, such as
the New Orleans Tribune‘s declaration that ―We shall
hear no more of that suicidal folly.131 These editorials,
129
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coupled with factual accounts of the horrific details on the
island, contributed to a public discourse that rejected
colonization once and for all following Île à Vache.
The failure of colonization as a feasible policy
option, while temporarily disheartening to Lincoln,
nonetheless left new opportunities for post-war racial
policies, particularly military enlistment and participation
in an emancipated nation. This turn to assimilation,
rather than displacement, found support within black
communities, particularly those who saw enlistment as an
avenue to support the nation and president that had
granted them freedom.132 African-African intellectuals had
embraced their own permanent status, as abolitionist and
staunch anti-colonization advocate David Walker wrote in
his Appeal that indeed the true ―promised land‖ for
former slaves was in the United States.133 Lincoln voiced
his support of black enlistment and subsequent positions
in the post-war society in his final public address on April
11, 1865, when he advocated for ―the elective franchise…
on those that serve our cause as soldiers,‖ an effort he
argued would sustain the reunified Republic.134 Through
statements such as this, the President offered optimism of
black allegiance and democratic participation in a way that
132
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would never require such ill-conceived attempts as Île à
Vache again. In the symbolic transition from colonization
to assimilation, a number of the surviving men of the
colony found both shelter and income through enlistment
in the Union army, fulfilling one black abolitionist‘s desire
for recognition that ―this land which we have watered with
our tears and our blood, is now our mother country.‖135
Despite its failure on both humanitarian and
political grounds, the Île à Vache excursion proved to
have one positive lasting consequence for the United
States and the legacy of Abraham Lincoln in the realm of
diplomacy, specifically through the diplomatic recognition
of Haiti. Following Toussaint L‘Ouverture‘s 1804 victory
and subsequent expulsion of French colonists from the
island state, the Jefferson administration issued a
temporary embargo and diplomatic non-recognition of
the sole black-controlled state in the Western
Hemisphere; the latter policy soon became a norm for
Jefferson‘s successors in the White House.136 This policy
stood in stark contrast to the traditional de facto policy of
diplomatic recognition toward former Spanish and
French colonies in the Americas, described by the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in 1822 when it reported to
President James Monroe, ―it is sufficient that it is really
sovereign and independent,‖ as grounds for recognition, a
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qualification that undoubtedly applied in Haiti.137 The Île
à Vache endeavor, however, caused a rapid shift in this
policy, as American involvement on Haitian soil
necessitated recognition of the state that had already
signed a contract with Kock.138 On December 3, 1861,
one year prior to his approval of the Île à Vache proposal,
as part of his annual address to Congress, Lincoln
recommended the recognition of both Haiti and Liberia,
citing ―important commercial advantages might be
secured by favorable commercial treaties with them.‖139
Within months the United States had formally
reestablished ties with Haiti; in response, the Republican
press praised Lincoln, typified by the New York Times
proclaiming victory over the era ―when the slave-lords
ruled in our legislative halls.‖140 The diplomatic
recognition of Haiti after decades of ambivalence and
hostility demonstrates that for all of the individual losses
of the Île à Vache fiasco, some good still managed to
emerge from the island.
The historiographical conversation surrounding
Île à Vache is focused on one of the more confounding
aspects of the abolitionist movement and presidency of
Abraham Lincoln, specifically, support of colonization as
a policy appendage of emancipation. To an observer
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today, the concept of colonization appears at its most
innocuous to be infeasible and at its most malicious as the
ultimate solution for American racists.141 Colonization as a
serious policy option appears outlandish from a
contemporary perspective, and Lincoln‘s support for
black emigration provides a contrast from the image of
the Great Emancipator. A range of scholarly works exists
on national and local efforts to spur African American
colonization up until the Civil War, as well,
demonstrating the persistence of this movement in the
antebellum years.142 Nonetheless, writings concerning
Lincoln and colonization focus primarily on his
ideological support for the movement, rather than his
tangible efforts to enact such a policy. Therein lies Île à
Vache; the Haitian island provided an ideal
experimentation for these grand schemes, all to collapse
in a spectacular fashion. For the majority of writings, even
those specific to the endeavor, Île à Vache is but one
example of colonization as a failed policy, rather than as a
pivotal moment in Lincoln‘s strategy toward a post-
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Emancipation and biracial United States.143 Ultimately the
historical record, as proven in this essay through a
combination of policy shifts and lack of official statements
following the disaster are more reliable than speculation,
demonstrating that the Haitian excursion was the death
knell for colonization.
An evaluation of the historical narratives of
colonization reveals one of the most contentious aspects
of Lincoln scholarship, specifically his beliefs regarding
race. Some historians have viewed Lincoln‘s support for
colonization as an indelible blemish on his legacy,
characterized by Eric Foner‘s description of these
programs as ―the ethnic cleansing of America‖ in one
review.144 Both this interpretation, as well as a newfound
interest in colonization as anything but a footnote in
history, emerged in the 1960s with a newfound
historiographical interest in race.145 Some of these more
vociferous analyses assert that ―to his dying day‖ Lincoln
questioned the ability of blacks and whites to coexist in a
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), he concludes a
section on Lincoln‘s views on colonization by referring to Île à
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colonization historiography. (Burt 365).
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post-Emancipation United States.146 Nonetheless, these
accounts provide a view of the President that frequently
do not place colonization within its proper historical
context, despite its obvious faults in both morality and
pragmatism, as well as rejection within the black
community. The accounts of abolitionists wary of Lincoln
furthered the historiographical debate over Lincoln and
race, a persistent and inflammatory element of his
legacy.147 It is evident that an examination of the tragedy at
Île à Vache contributes to a controversial but relevant
appraisal of Lincoln‘s presidency, and thus must it be
interpreted in both its failure as an endeavor as well as a
driver of future policy.
When the Marcia Gay departed the shores of Île
à Vache on March 4, 1864, it left behind not only the
ruins of one failed experiment at black resettlement, but
also the fate of a movement itself. The Île à Vache fiasco
was a combination of governmental mismanagement,
individual malfeasance, and misplaced policy ambitions,
together culminating in death and disease for a chosen
collection of society‘s most marginalized residents.
Ultimately the responsibility for these failures fell on the
shoulders of Abraham Lincoln, who made the concerted
effort to not only rescue the surviving members of the
expedition for return to American shores, but to forever
abandon future schemes of black resettlement. In the
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place of colonization, Lincoln instead explored ways to
integrate those he had freed into a post-emancipation
society, shaping future efforts to reunite the United States.
Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote, ―The great privilege
enjoyed by Americans is not to be more enlightened than
other nations but also to have the chance to make
mistakes that can be retrieved.‖148 The incident on Île à
Vache, while undeniably a tragic and preventable event,
proved a retrievable mistake through the negation of an
unfeasible and unpopular solution to racial questions,
replaced by subsequent transformation toward a more
integrated future.
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Book Review: The Fall of the House of Dixie, by Bruce
Levine
Brexton O'Donnel
Bruce Levine's The Fall of the House of Dixie (2013)
opens with a stirring reminder of the size and wealth of
the antebellum Southern states, and the fact that much of
that wealth was in human capital. Levine extensively
details the immense wealth tied up in slavery, and the
luxurious lifestyle of the Southern slave-holding elite. The
book‘s goal is to stress the importance of slavery as an
economic and social institution for white Southerners,
and a central fact of life for them. Levine argues that the
Civil War transformed from a conventional military
conflict into a revolutionary struggle that transformed
American society and politics. His core thesis is that the
Civil War brought about a great social and political
revolution in the American South especially. Most of the
book consists of Levine seeking to demonstrate how the
structures of wealth and power in the South, founded on
the cornerstone of slavery, were radically altered by the
Civil War in an event he calls ―the second American
revolution.‖149
Levine begins the book by laying out the
background of ―The House of Dixie‖ and continues
chronologically recounting its fall through the war and
into Reconstruction. He devotes successive chapters to
the early phases of the war, the evolution of Federal war
policy towards slaves and slaveholders, and the
progressive collapse of Southern society. Levine takes a
dual approach in making his argument. Calling on an
Bruce Levine, The Fall of the House of Dixie: The Civil
War and the Social Revolution that Transformed the South,
149
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impressive array of sources, Levine spends much of the
book examining the relationship of slavery to the society
and economy of the Confederacy. Dissent in the
Confederacy, which resulted in the creation of West
Virginia and guerrilla warfare in Unionist East Tennessee,
comes in for close scrutiny.
Some of these poor whites took up arms against
the Confederacy out of resentment at their wealthier
neighbors leading them into war. However, Levine also
notes that even many poor whites continued to support
the Confederacy.
Still, conflict between poor whites and the Confederacy
demonstrated the weakening of the socio-economic
foundations that the House of Dixie stood on.
Throughout the book, particular attention is paid to the
amount of slaves that abandoned the Confederacy in the
wake of the Federal armies' advance.
The military successes of the Federal armies
continuously weakened the institution of slavery in the
Confederacy, and as the fortunes of slavery waned, so did
the enthusiasm of Confederates for the war. Levine does
not forget to look at the situation through the eyes of the
slaves either. Where the collapse of the South brought
ruin to slaveholders, it uplifted the newly freed black
population of the South and greatly altered their position
in Southern society, as they could no longer be sold or
forcibly separated from their families.
A recurring theme throughout Levine's chapters
in the latter half of the book is the increasing Confederate
fear of what the impending end of slavery will mean, and
their failed efforts to control their slaves. Levine's rigorous
examination of the increasing amount of cracks in the
social cohesion of the Confederacy throughout the book
is its greatest strength.
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Levine also examines the political relationship of
slavery to the war, particularly in the context of Federal
war aims. Levine demonstrates how the aims of Lincoln
and the Republican Party in regards to slavery changed
over the course of the war. Levine rightly emphasizes that
the Republican Party was not a revolutionary party. While
the Republican Party was committed to undermining
slavery, they preferred gradual change. In the early days
of the war, only the most radical Republicans foresaw the
end of slavery in the near future. Originally, the party
embraced a limited war for the Union. The logic of
events forced the Republicans to embrace a more radical
policy, targeting slavery to win the war.150
Levine successfully crafts a provocative social history
of the American Civil War that neatly describes the
origins of the Southern rebellion and the social changes
that ultimately transformed the South and brought about
the end of the House of Dixie. The dual nature of the
book serves it well, as Levine illustrates the social changes
and tensions that unraveled the Confederacy's socioeconomic structure, while providing a clear political
backdrop that contextualizes the transformation of the
South with Northern war aims. Much of the book's
political content is not groundbreaking, and in the hands
of another author, might come off as tedious. But Levine
successfully crafts a compelling narrative that skillfully
incorporates a wide range of sources.
Levine also addresses the aftermath of the Civil
War, pointing out that as the blood-toll of the Civil War
mounted, Southerners were reluctantly reconciled to
rejoining the Union. They did so while maintaining hopes
of being able to restore some form of their social system,
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and in this, they eventually succeeded.151 A thorny issue
for a scholar arguing that the Civil War represented a
social revolution that transformed the South is that the
post-Reconstruction South managed to recreate many
elements of the antebellum Southern society and retain
political power. Yet Levine argues persuasively that the
setbacks do not detract from what the ―second American
revolution‖ did accomplish, which was to end slavery
forever and advance the greater cause of liberty. Bruce
Levine has penned a superb work that will stand as one of
the premier social histories of the American Civil War.
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―The Southern Heart Still Throbs‖:
Caroline E. Janney and Partisan Memory‘s Grip on the
Post-Civil War Nation
Heather Clancy

―Memory is not a passive act,‖ writes Caroline E.
Janney in the prologue of her 2013 book Remembering
the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation.
Rather, it is a deliberate process. Our nation‘s history has
been shaped by countless hands in innumerable ways,
and the story of our civil war is no exception. In
Remembering the Civil War, Janney seeks to turn our
eyes once again onto the players, large and small, who
shaped what came to be the accepted narrative of the
conflict, from its inception through the 1930s and even
bleeding through the Civil Rights Era and into the
present. By examining the Civil War generation and its
children, Janney sheds light on the evolution of an often
vitriolic and always contested Civil War memory, one
jaggedly split between reunion and reconciliation,
progress and precedent, image and truth. Janney‘s
postwar South is not only un-Reconstructed, but unReconciled. The world of postwar memory construction
that Janney paints for the reader is not David Blight‘s
largely uncomplicated portrait of a willful reconciliation
found through a common (white) racial identity. Instead,
she offers a messy but intriguing alternative: the clasping
of hands across the bloody chasm, but accompanied by
clenched teeth and bitter resentment.
At the crux of her evaluation is her differentiation
between ―reunion‖ and ―reconciliation.‖ The former was
easily accepted by Confederate veterans, explains Janney,
for although it was the bitter result of a military surrender,
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it was not automatically emasculating or subjugating.
Reconciliation, though, implied an alarmingly personal
and yet simultaneously collective surrender, not only of
armies, but also of spirit, bravery, and cause. The fight
between Union and Confederate veterans as well as their
descendants for control over the Civil War narrative,
then, was in reality for legitimacy.
Janney treats gender, race, region, and generation
with care, assessing not only each category but also the
interplay between them. Janney is also careful to
distinguish between civilian and military wartime and
postwar experiences and the roles that both groups played
in shaping Civil War memory. Her discussion of
feminized memory—the part that women, and particularly
white Southern women, played in this process is skillful.
Her argument that women saw in popular Civil War
memory a chance for pseudo-political engagement and
even agency is intriguing, as is her theory that veterans of
both sides in the decades following the war merely wore a
façade of reconciliation and allowed their politically nonthreatening wives, sisters, and daughters to fight the battles
for memory supremacy in their place.
Janney‘s analysis of the cyclical nature of Civil
War memory is both clear and generally concise. Her
argument falters noticeably only once, in her epilogue.
Here she comments on the denial by ―most Americans
[and] especially whites‖ of the central role that slavery
played in the coming of the war. She does this despite
having reassured the reader repeatedly throughout the
book that northerners have never once been fully taken in
by the sickly sweet charm of the ex-Confederacy‘s Lost
Cause. But if a majority of Americans accept the Lost
Cause view of slavery as unrelated to the causes of the
Civil War, then how can a Lost Cause interpretation of
the war have ―become increasingly marginalized‖? This
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one notable self-contradiction is Janney‘s sole faltering
worthy of mention; nowhere else in the book does such a
confusion of argument arise.

Remembering the Civil War paces the ground
between history and mythos in a briar patch of passed
down lore, seeking out kernels of truth. Ultimately,
Janney comes to few definitive conclusions by her
epilogue, but it is well that she does not. Just as ―no single
vision of the war could encompass the range of meanings
and understandings such a vast American public found in
the conflict,‖ so too do we find ourselves adrift in a sea of
contradictory historical narratives today. Although it can
be tempting to view our Civil War past as just that,
Janney‘s murkier look at the postbellum period leaves
Sesquicentennial-era historians and historiophiles to
wonder just how reconciled our divided past truly is. The
bloody shirt may no longer be damp with the blood of
our fellow citizens, but it would seem that the stains are
still visible.
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D. Scott Hartwig, Supervisory Historian for
Gettysburg National Military Park, retired in the fall
of 2013. In recognition of his long service to the park
and community of Gettysburg, Associate Editor
Thomas Nank interviewed Mr. Hartwig concerning
his personal experiences gained over three decades
working at Gettysburg as well as the future of the
National Park Service and the field of public history
in general.
How does a Park Ranger successfully communicate
events of 150 years ago to today‘s college generation?
I‘d say you do it the same way we‘ve always done it,
by making it relevant. If you don‘t establish
relevancy, the events of 150 years ago ultimately are
meaningless. We did student these education
programs that were curriculum based, and one of the
programs was Pickett‘s Charge. The students were
placed in the role of one of Pickett‘s regiments, they
learned something about the men, they learned what
brought the war on, and what might motivate the
men. They were given identities of the men, so they
learned different things about the occupations of the
men. During the program, you walk the students
across the field, so they get the idea that a lot of guys
didn‘t make it, some were killed or wounded or
ended up missing in action. It was a group of juniors
from a private school in Washington DC. They
were black and white, and they were all guys from an
all-boys school, and they were pretty wild. I knew
enough that when you‘re dealing with students like
that, that being a disciplinarian is never going to
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works, so you have to build respect with them. So
they were having fun, goofing around, and we got
halfway across the field, and I stopped all of them. I
said ―Look, guys, quiet down for just a minute.
We‘re walking across this field, like 13,000
Confederate soldiers did over 100 and some years
ago, you‘re never going to have to do this, right?
Doesn‘t mean anything to you, you‘re never going to
have to do it. People don‘t do this, line up and
march across a field, face bullets and shells, right?‖
Now at this point their curiosity was peaked: where‘s
he going with this thing? So I said ―There‘s never
going to be a cop, that gets called for a domestic
dispute, and there‘s somebody behind that door
who‘s armed, and you have to go through it. There‘s
never going to be a fire, where somebody‘s trapped
inside that house, and somebody‘s got to have the
balls to go up that ladder and get that person out.
Never going to happen, right? The point is, what
these men did, people have to do every day. They
have to face the challenge that this might be the last
day on earth for that guy, they have to face their
fears, they‘ve got to go through that veritable wall of
bullets and shell fragments, and at the same time you
know, we may be in another war again, you never
know what‘s coming down the pike. You‘re not
going to have to make Pickett‘s Charge again, but
you are going to face things in your life, that these
men had to face, and find the courage to conquer it.
That‘s what you can learn today‖. And from that
point on, those kids listened to every single thing I
said. And I knew a lot of them at the end of the
program, were really thinking about it. Until I
attempted to do something to make it relevant, they
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were like, what does this mean to me, why should I
care about this? Up to that point, they didn‘t care.
But the same thing is true college students or adults,
if you‘re not making it relevant for them, why does it
matter, why should I care? So I come here to
Gettysburg, there‘s a bunch of monuments, some
guys did this or that, why should I care, why does it
matter? So you have to establish some type of
relevancy.
How do you inspire today‘s high school and college
students to pursue the study of history?
I‘d say you inspire them to study history by bringing
history alive, and encouraging people to pursue
things that interest them in history. A lot of times,
people have a tendency to say there‘s only a certain
way you can learn history. You study it, you write it,
and that‘s the appropriate way. Some people go out
and do living history, why do people do that?
People experience history in different ways. That
person who likes to get dressed up a portray a Civil
War soldier, that may be their conduit for learning a
lot more about the Civil War. When the movie
―Gettysburg‖ came out, a lot of people at the park,
Rangers and guides, they were really down on it, as a
movie in some parts its absolutely ridiculous. But
the thing about the movie is that it really reached a
huge number of people, and it was a great place to
start from with visitors. Okay, so you‘ve seen the
movie, you remember such-and-such that happened
in the movie, now let‘s talk about what really
happened. People are always interested in that. You
can get people charged up about history when you
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start talking about people in history, rather than units
and tactics and strategy and statistics and those sorts
of things, they can be really interesting. But to the
average person, it‘s generally people that draw you in
and really get you going. How many people have
had a ―love affair‖ with Joshua Chamberlain, and
then suddenly started reading and finding out about
these other things?
As a historian, how has working for the NPS affected
the way in which you approach history?
Well for one thing, as an NPS historian, you‘re a
public historian, and when you‘re doing
interpretation for the public, they can just get up and
walk away, they‘re not paying to listen to you, its free.
You have to be skilled in how you present
controversial material. So you‘re in the National
Cemetery and you want to talk about what the war
was about, and you‘ve got some people on that
program who are neo-Confederates. They don‘t
think it had anything to do with slavery. Now how
do you keep those people on the program? You
have to make them think, because if you verbally
punch them between the eyes, they‘re leaving
because they don‘t want to hear to what you have to
say. So as an NPS historian, you learn the fine art of
finessing how you tell people things. As another
example: once I was giving a Pickett‘s Charge walk
for adults, it was a two-hour walk. The program
focused on the attack, its main purpose was to talk
about why did Lee make the attack, why did the
attack fail, and what were the consequences of it.
When we got half-way across the field, I stopped
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everybody and I said ―Ok, let‘s talk about why these
men are coming across this field, trying to kill those
men, who are waiting for them, and are going to deal
death to them. Why are they doing it? Let‘s talk
about the individual, why is he doing it? There are a
multitude of reasons. They may like the uniform,
they got coerced into doing it, their girlfriend wanted
them to do it, they believe in what they‘re fighting
for, there‘s all sorts of reasons they‘re going in. But
what is their government fighting for? If you‘re a
Confederate soldier, you‘re fighting to set up a slave
holding republic. That‘s what you‘re fighting for. If
you‘re a federal soldier, you‘re fighting to preserve
the Union, and by this point in the war to destroy
slavery. Doesn‘t matter whether you care or don‘t
care about those things, thats what you‘re fighting for.
Now let‘s move on to the attack…‖ So all you want
to do is make people think. You don‘t want to hit
them over the head with stuff, because that‘s the
quickest way to turn them off. All I ever wanted to
do in those situations is put a little something in there
that got the wheels turning, and maybe cause them to
question some of the things that they thought.
What part of your training or education was the most
fundamental to your job? Why was it so meaningful
and how did it shape your work?
I don‘t want to be uncharitable to the Park Service,
but it does not have a training program to prepare
somebody to work in a Civil War park. In the early
years, they did do a pretty good job of training
people to be interpreters, training people to
interpret: what does interpretation mean, what are
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the fundamentals of it? They had these different
courses all interpreters were supposed to go through.
But I would say for myself, personally, two things in
college that prepared me the best for working at
Gettysburg. One was that I took three credit courses
from E. B. Long, the research editor for Bruce
Catton. The last course I took from him, was a
course that he designed for me and one other guy,
which was an unbelievable experience, and really
fantastic. I wish I could have done more with him,
but I learned a lot from him about doing good Civil
War history. The second thing was we had a
professor, at the University of Wyoming named
Myron Sutton who was an NPS employee, and the
NPS didn‘t know what to do with him, because he
was towards the end of his career. He had been
involved in setting up some parks, like Mt. Cook in
New Zealand, Tiger Tops in Nepal, and he was an
amazing photographer, he and his wife. He did
these three screen slide presentations, and taught
several courses that talked about the national parks,
the NPS, and interpretation. I learned a lot from
him about what interpretation really was. Other
history courses I took were also very helpful but
Long was really good, combined with this strong
background in interpretation and how the Park
Service worked before I even got to Gettysburg really
helped me a lot.
What has been the most significant change in the
NPS since you first started?
Probably the most significant change in the NPS
since I started is doing more with less. If the Park
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Service was a business, its buying power has been
severely eroded. In 1980, they were talking about it
then, ―we‘re going to have to do more with less.‖
But the ―more with less‖ in 1980 and 2014 are like
night and day. To give you an example of how that
works: In 1991 the Visitor Center at Gettysburg, and
we were really impressed, got 465,000 visitors which
was a huge number. It gets about 1.2 million visitors
a year now. We have no more buying power, no
more staff, no more anything. In fact, overall in the
park we have less. So think about any business that
tripled the amount of customers that doesn‘t make
itself any bigger, it just asks its people to do more
stuff. That‘s been a big issue. The second thing I‘d
say, and this is more specific to the Civil War parks
and Gettysburg, is the broadening of interpretation.
I wouldn‘t say that that‘s universal, because what
happens at one park doesn‘t necessarily happen at
another. I always tell people: think of the parks as
kind of like a Navy: they all fly the same flag, they all
have different captains, and they all have different
ways of doing things. Some people don‘t like what
this park is doing, so they do their own thing. We all
know about the ―Rally on the High Ground‖ and the
broadening of interpretation, some parks gave it a
little bit of lip service but don‘t do anything towards
it. And some parks have been diminished so much
they hardly do any interpretation at all. Gettysburg is
lucky, we do a lot of interpretation. Fredericksburg
does a lot of interpretation. Some parks just don‘t
have the people to do it. They‘re more traditional:
put a Park Ranger behind a desk, he or she smiles
and greets people and tells them where the
restrooms are and when the film starts and maybe
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give a little 5-minute introductory talk. Or they have
a guy in a uniform that talks about the Civil War
soldier, but doesn‘t really get into motivations or any
of that stuff. Its very uneven but, in general, we are
much better off than we were 30 years ago, a lot
better off.
What do you see as the NPS's greatest challenge?
Getting quality people. Its a challenge, a real
challenge. In the government today, particularly in
the Park Service, the process for applying is really
difficult, complicated and confusing. Our personnel
office that has to rate and rank applications when
they come in are really overworked, those places
took a lot of hits in personnel. They contract out a
lot of that stuff. If you want to take care of the parks,
you gotta get the best people. You really want to
work with the best people. A lot of the best people
get demoralized by the process and they get a job
somewhere else. Sometimes its people who simply
can‘t get a job anywhere else, or its someone who just
stays at it for so long they end up getting the job, but
they‘re not the best person. For managers, I would
say, its continuing to find resources to continue to do
your job, and protect, preserve and interpret your
park. That is going to be a really big challenge.
We‘re lucky here at Gettysburg because we have the
Gettysburg Foundation. If we didn‘t have that, it
would be Little Big Horn time, or at least we‘d be on
the road there! [laughter].
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What are your thoughts about the relationship
between GNMP, CWI and history students at
Gettysburg College? Are there ways you think those
relationships could be improved?
I think they‘ve been really good. We‘ve had great
luck with our work study students, every single
person we‘ve had from the College has been
fantastic. One of them is a permanent Ranger now,
Chris Gwinn. What I think makes [the
relationships] the best is when there‘s open
communications between the Institute and whoever
happens to be in the position as the Chief of
Interpretation at Gettysburg, that they‘re both
working together to find things that will benefit
students. At the same time, the park is making
people aware of things that are going on at the
Institute that will benefit people who work at the
park, and also visitors that come to the park. We‘ve
had a number of people who were work study
students or were volunteers for us or interns in the
summertime who have been associated with the Civil
War Institute. In fact, I‘ll say that one of the best
things that‘s happened between the park and the
Institute is Pete Carmichael. When Pete got here,
and he is, among the academics I‘ve known over the
years, he is unusual to me in how hard he works for
his students, to try to give them real-world
experiences that will make them more competitive
for jobs. One of the things he set up is the intern
interview process, where all these people from
Appomattox and Fredericksburg and Manassas and
almost all the other parks come here to interview
interns, and I‘ll tell you what, its a fantastic thing that
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he did. Previous to that, we didn‘t get a lot of interns
from Gettysburg College, they just didn‘t apply for
internships.
What is one thing about the battle here that still
puzzles you?
There‘s a lot of things you‘d love to know the answer
to. Did Captain Johnson really get on to Little
Round Top? Just where did Captain Johnson go?
What did Lee tell him, and what did Lee tell
General Longstreet when Johnson was going to
accompany Longstreet‘s march? As I like to point
out to people, think about this: he tells Longstreet
that Captain Johnson will be your guide. Johnson is
not there. He tells Johnson that I want you to
accompany Longstreet‘s command. Those are two
entirely different things! Particularly in the Army of
Northern Virginia they did things like that all the
time. Of course you‘d love to know all the things
that went back and forth between Sickles and
Meade. I think its fairly well established that Sickles,
if orders had any meaning, did in fact have orders [to
stay where he was]. The Confederate army, because
they lose the battle, is actually far less well
documented than the Union army is. So where is
Lee throughout much of July 2nd? Why does Lee
think that a reconnaissance that was performed at
5:00 am is still viable almost 12 hours later, that
nothing has changed? That seems kind of unusual
to me. I‘d certainly love to know what Lee was
thinking, and I have a lot of speculations, but I‘d like
to know what was he thinking when he thought
Pickett‘s Charge was a good idea. What was running
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through his head? What was his thought process
that caused him to arrive at that decision.
If you had one career ―do-over‖, what would you do
differently?
There‘s probably a lot of things I‘d do differently!
[laughter]. At Gettysburg it was pretty great, it was
the ideal situation. I had a boss [recently retired
park Superintendent Bob Kirby] who worked to get
you the resources you needed to get the work done,
and gave you the freedom to be creative, and trusted
you, put implicit trust in what you did. And that is
rare, really rare, to find somebody who will do that.
We had this opportunity to do all these really cool
things at the park. Maybe I would have done some
of them earlier, I don‘t know. I honestly can‘t think
of anything at this point that I would say I‘m
definitely going to do that differently.
What are you most proud of accomplishing in your
career?
Several things, one would be the museum. That was
a huge amount of work and I think that it came out
fantastically. I think the building works really, really
well. The interpretive program we developed I think
is outstanding. It really reaches a lot of different
aspects of the war, there‘s a lot of variety to it.
Economically, I have no doubt at all, it has benefited
this community a great deal because there‘s a reason
to come here to the park. There are these public
programs you can go on. Think about the
anniversary battle walks that we did, when you have
99

400-500 people show up: they all have to go eat
somewhere. They stay at hotels. Now imagine we
don‘t do that. Imagine we never started it, never did
it and nobody shows up. Those are the sorts of
intangible benefits; everybody loves to bitch about
the government, but hey, you know what? The
government working with private industry can be a
real catalyst. I‘m proud of all the seminars that we
did, and the books that we published from those
seminars, they were a lot of work but they were
definitely worth all the work we put into them. My
point always was, you can give the greatest talk in the
world but it‘s like building this really cool campfire:
everybody sits around it and later has great memories
of the campfire, but they can‘t put everything back
together the way it was again. But when you write
something, you‘ve got it. It‘s there. You can go back
to it over and over again. I can‘t tell you how many
times, when I‘ve wrote something for one of our
seminars, and now it‘s about 6 or 7 years later, and
I‘m thinking such-and-such happened, it went this
way or that way, and I go back to the seminar paper
that I wrote, and I‘m like ―I‘m completely wrong‖
because I‘ve just forgotten! But the ability to go back
to some resource that you or somebody else has
created, it really is pretty neat, I‘m really proud of
that. I‘m proud of all the work that everyone at the
park did, but I‘m also proud of the little contribution
I made to the landscape rehabilitation of the
battlefield.
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If you had one more year left before you retired,
what would you try to accomplish at GNMP?
I think probably what I would have done if I had not
retired is I would have tried to become Chief of
Interpretation at Gettysburg. I would have used my
time there to allow some of our really creative people
to build upon what we have already done. Because,
what I‘d be looking for is, you‘re going to retire, this
isn‘t about you, it‘s about the park and those people
that come after you. Helping those people build the
foundation for taking the park further into the 21st
century, building that solid foundation for the park
and empowering those people who are the creative
ones and the hard workers. I would have done
collaborations with the Gettysburg Foundation. I
would have tried to redo a thing we had done before,
where we brought Dr. Carmichael in to do a
workshop with people from all the Civil War parks
in the North Atlantic region. I‘d do something like
that again with academics, because I think that
academics can learn some things from public
historians, but public historians can learn a lot from
academics because the difference between the two of
us is we are doing research for the next program
coming up, but academics are on the cutting edge of
research. So that we can learn from the research
they are doing and apply it to our public history. I
would have tried to build a greater bridge between
those two worlds, the academic world and the public
history world because I think there‘s a lot to be
gained by doing that. I would have used the
Gettysburg Foundation however it could be used to
help facilitate that. The other thing I would have
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definitely done would be to work with the
Foundation to see if we could get research grants.
Years ago when Eastern National used to run our
bookstore, they had a program where you could
apply for research grants. We got a few of them, and
we sent researchers out to state and county historical
societies, college repositories, and we got some
unbelievable Gettysburg primary source material, just
phenomenal stuff. In some places we just scratched
the surface because there‘s a ton of it out there that
you‘ve got to have time and money to go and get,
and you have to look at it, you just can‘t write them
to send you such-and-such. That would have been
another thing to work on. The reality would have
been I wouldn‘t have gotten any of that done in a
year! [laughter]. In five years maybe I would have
gotten some of it done…
What is your most vivid memory of the Gettysburg
150th commemoration events at the park this
summer?
Three things just stick in my mind. One is the Last
March of the Iron Brigade. The whole event was an
incredible experience unlike anything I‘ve ever had
at the park, and I‘ve had some really cool
experiences at the park. When we got up near the
North Carolina monument, I was at the very front of
the column and I looked back and the tail end of the
marchers was still at the Emmitsburg Road. It was
amazing, and how fantastic the visitors were in
keeping together and forming up. It was really pretty
magical. The living history group that we had [the
Liberty Rifles], that‘s a great example. Take the
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Liberty Rifles out: not the same program. I don‘t
care how good Dan Welch and I could have been, it
would not have been the same program. Those guys
made that program, they gave it an energy it wouldn‘t
have been there otherwise. The second thing is of
course would have been Pickett‘s Charge. It was a
giant risk and a gamble. We did a lot of planning on
it to organize the visitors so that the visitors would
maneuver to the operational plan I drew up for
everybody. We were following the same tactical plan
that the Confederates did in the attack. Fry‘s brigade
is the unit of direction, so that Garnett guided on
that, Kemper guided on Garnett, and Armistead
stayed 200 yards behind Kemper. And everything
worked out, it was amazing. I expected we might get
about 10,000 people on it, we ended up with about
40,000. I had a lot of worries about it. I was
concerned that (1) it could get out of control, and (2)
it could become a Confederate love fest, which I did
not want it to be. But I was willing to run the risk
that there would be a lot of Confederate battle flags
out there, and I know that‘s controversial for the
NPS to be holding an event, with all these
Confederate flags flying around and celebrating the
Confederacy 150 years afterwards. That‘s not really
what we should be doing. The other part of me was,
I‘m trusting that people are going to be respectful.
We tried to set up an event where you could walk
across that field with a Confederate flag if you want,
you have a right to fly any flag you want really out
there, but there were a lot of people I knew who had
ancestors, or they were from states that these men
had come from, and all they wanted to do was to
walk across that ground at that time. They didn‘t
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want to celebrate the Confederate cause, they just
wanted to remember their ancestors and what they
had gone through, and I wanted those people to have
that opportunity just as I wanted people on Cemetery
Ridge to have the opportunity to be present and an
active participant, so that everyone involved was a
participant rather than an onlooker. And that
worked, it ended up working out. We had some
little incidents with some folks who thought the Civil
War was still going on [laughter]. And the last thing
is, I don‘t know why this sticks in my mind: Todd
Bolton was in charge of all the interpretive programs
out in the field. Ernie Price was my deputy, because
Ernie is going to be doing the 150th anniversary at
Appomattox Court House. So the three of us on
July 2nd are trying to get out and visit all of the key
moment stations. It was almost impossible, there
were people everywhere, all over the place. But the
great thing was, everywhere you went everybody was
in such a good mood, and it was humid as hell and
threatening rain, but everybody was having such a
good time. I think part of it was we tried to plan so
that there was always stuff for people to be doing,
something coming up or something happening. You
weren‘t just wandering around, you had to get to the
next station or the next hike or there was something
you wanted to get to. And we got up to Little Round
Top finally, I took us about an hour and a half to get
up there, and we pulled up in the car, and I see Jim
Flook, one of our seasonal Rangers, and he‘s just
drenched in sweat with the biggest smile on his face,
he‘s just beaming. He said ―Allison did the first talk,
and she had 200 people.‖ That was 9:00 in the
morning! Just the look of excitement on Jim‘s face
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and all the visitors we ran into, it was just an amazing
event. So those things always leap into my mind
when I think of the 150th.
When the Civil War sesquicentennial celebrations
are over in 2015, what comes next for Civil War
historians?
I think if we‘ve done our job the events that we had
should get another generation excited about visiting
Civil War battlefields, and understanding how the
Civil War relates to their life. They become the next
generation, that then brings their kids. So that in a
way, you always have to have something for a
generation that energizes people and reconnects
them with their history. We are clearly a country that
just keeps moving on, we march on and we don‘t
look back, generally, and we often times don‘t like to
be reminded of where we came from because of
assorted parts of our past. Past 2015, what you have
to do is to stay creative. You have to continue to do
some of the traditional things you‘ve always done that
have connected with the visiting public, but you also
have to find ways that connect with a public that
maybe doesn‘t see the relevancy in a battle walk, but
they would like to know what happened on the 2nd
day of the battle. To me, the future is (and I know
the Park Service is looking at wayside exhibits and
things like that) for the Park Service to recruit a new
batch of interpreters who can do the interpretation
on the field, but have the skills to carry the battlefield
out through blogs, through Facebook, through apps,
that enable people anywhere in the world to connect
with us, because that‘s the way you‘re going to get
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people really energized about wanting to come here
one day. You‘re always having to go back and make
history interesting and relevant. When we started
our blog at the park, some people said it‘s got to be
really short, like a paragraph. I said that‘s absolutely
wrong. For some blogs, you‘re right. But for this
kind of blog if it doesn‘t have something of
substance, they‘re not going to read it. The person
that‘s going to come to this blog is interested, not just
cruising around looking at stuff, and it‘s got to be
worth their time. You have to tell the stories about
this park that are the stories you couldn‘t tell on an
interpretive program, or stories that move people to
say ―you know what? We need to go back down to
Gettysburg this summer.‖ That‘s what you‘re trying
to do through social media, those sorts of things.
Some people who think in traditional terms, look at
a Ranger sitting at a computer and say, get that guy
out behind the desk. So you get that well-trained
Ranger out at a desk (which a volunteer could do),
and he sees maybe 30, 40, 60 people on a two-hour
shift. However, if they stayed at that computer, and
completed that blog post or Facebook post, that just
reached 25,000 people. Which was the more
efficient use of their time? That‘s how I think you
have to look at it.
What is next for Scott Hartwig?
Working on volume two of the Antietam campaign.
I have a couple of ideas for other books after that
once I finish it. I‘d like to be able to do some
writing. I love writing, I like the research, and it was
getting to the point in my later years at the park
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where I didn‘t have time to write.
Any advice for the next generation of historians?
Don‘t get so mired down in the academia, or the
bureaucracy if you‘re in the public history world,
where you forget why we‘re doing this. Why are we
interested in history? Why do we want to learn
about history, why do we want to share what we
know with people? It comes back again to making it
relevant and telling those stories that move people.
There are all sorts of academics that have criticized
Bruce Catton and Stephen Ambrose and James
McPherson over the years because they reach a
broad audience, but I would say: how do you do
really good history and reach a broad audience?
That‘s your challenge. If you‘re only preaching to a
tiny group of people, it really doesn‘t matter
anymore, they won‘t find any value in it. If people
don‘t visit the parks and find value in the parks,
we‘re failing. Do academic history, but also make
history relevant for the broader masses out there that
don‘t really understand it.
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